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I. INTRODUCTION
Joint ventures have fired corporate imaginations and captured the
fancy of government officials, who perceive them as key weapons in the
struggle to achieve global competitiveness.
Characterizing the trend as corporate America's version of the sin-
gles bar, Business Week reports that in the current rage for "strategic
alliances," scarcely a day passes without the announcement of another
cooperative inter-corporate agreement.' The London Economist reports
that "just as the vogue for aggressive takeovers in America and Britain
has come to an end, many of the world's biggest companies are scram-
bling to sign up joint-venture partners or to conclude an alliance with a
confederate in some other country."2 The Wall Street Journal describes
the number of international joint ventures as having "rocketed" in recent
years,3 prompting some analysts to anoint them "the wave of the
future."4
The paradoxical rationale advanced in support of these "partial
mergers"5 is that through cooperation they enhance competition. As ar-
ticulated by one prominent industry coalition, whose membership in-
cludes the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, the
global business environment in which advanced technology ventures must
compete is fast paced, expensive and demanding. Advanced technology
products have short lives; new or improved products are always just over a
nearby horizon, and the speed of innovation quickens each year. The cost
of research, development and manufacturing of these products is astound-
ing: a single production tool can cost millions of dollars. Investments in
manufacturing are measured in hundreds of millions of dollars, and ex-
penditures exceeding a half-billion dollars are not uncommon.6
1 Levine, Corporate Odd Couples, Bus. WK., July 21, 1986, at 100.
2 The Latest Business Game, ECONOMIST, May 5, 1990, at 16.
3 Wysocki, Cross-Border Alliances Become Favorite Way to Crack New Markets, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 26, 1990, at 1, col. 6.
4 Levine, supra note 1.
5 See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
6 The Government Role in Joint Production Ventures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Science,
Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 244 (1989).
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If America is to compete effectively, the coalition warns, "U.S. com-
panies must have the flexibility to form joint manufacturing ventures to
spread risks, pool resources, share technologies and combine production
to lower costs." It urges an American-style response to the challenge of
a global economy - what it calls "compacts of competitiveness" - facil-
itated by a relaxation of antitrust policy toward these intercorporate
alliances.7
Some economists agree. They contend that "the need for coopera-
tive arrangements seems to have increased, driven by the fragmentation
of new industries like electronics coupled with steady escalation in the
costs of innovation." These developments, they urge, demand "a re-ex-
amination of our antitrust laws, which have been slow to recognize the
benefits of cooperative activity .... The new global economy, and the
declining significance of American firms within it, require a less restric-
tive approach toward interfirm agreements, alliances, and consortia."8
Top officials in the Bush administration also agree. Former Com-
merce Secretary C. William Verity charges that "U.S. firms are losing the
race to the marketplace. International competition is too fierce, and the
half-life of technology too brief, for many companies economically to
turn the fruits of research and development into products."9 Joint ven-
tures and corporate alliances, he claims, "would be the most efficient way
to bring new products to market." But, he warns, attempts by American
firms to engage in such cooperative arrangements are dangerously vul-
nerable to antitrust attack - a serious problem that he says produces "a
chilling effect.., on some kinds of technology development. Removing
the artificial barrier imposed by fear of antitrust," he concludes, "will
speed the translation of research into new products, and help U.S. firms
regain their competitive edge in the global market."10 As Commerce
7 Id. at 244-46. "'It is obvious to everyone that joint ventures are the way to go these days,'
asserts Jeff Perman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 'This is just one of the barnacles on Ameri-
can competition being scraped off."' U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 4, 1990, at 55.
8 Jorde & Teece, Competition and Cooperation: Striking the Right Balance, 31 CALIF. MGMT.
REV. 25, at 36 (Spring 1989).
These claims are scarcely novel. Nearly eighty years ago, in 1912, Charles Van Hise declared
that "cooperation in industry in order to secure efficiency [is] a world-wide movement. The United
States cannot resist it." He, too, ominously predicted that if "we isolate ourselves and insist upon
the subdivision of industry below the highest economic efficiency and do not allow cooperation, we
shall be defeated in the world's markets." C. VAN HisE, CONCENTRATION AND CONTROL: A SOLU-
TION OF THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 277 (1912), as cited in Kovacic, Failed
Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcen-
tration, 74 IowA L. REv. 1105, at 1130, note 159 (1989).
9 Verity, U.S. Firms Get Tripped in Race to the Marketplace, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1988, at A10,
col. 3 (op-ed article).
10 Id.
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Secretary Robert Mosbacher boldly states: "All American industries de-
serve the opportunity to form cooperative ventures that will enhance
their international competitiveness without exposing themselves to un-
warranted antitrust attack."11
The proponents of joint ventures are also sure that they do not pose
any meaningful market control problems. Omnipresent "global competi-
tion," they contend, will curb any cartelistic propensities that might
tempt corporate partners. Thus, professors Thomas Jorde and David
Teece observe that in the last two decades, "the level of competition fac-
ing firms in the U.S. economy has risen to a new height, heights driven in
part by competition from East Asian and European multinationals." As
a result, they assert, "the possibilities and opportunities to cartelize in-
dustries have dwindled and will stay low so long as the U.S. economy
remains open ... 12 They conclude that "concerns that cooperative
activity will monopolize final product markets are quite misplaced."13
These claims, and the pertinacious urgency with which they have
been pressed, have begun to significantly alter government policy. Cor-
porate joint ventures are receiving steadily expanding, sympathetic treat-
ment, including, most notably, an increasing degree of protection from
antitrust prosecution. In 1982, in order to promote American exports
abroad, Congress enacted the Export Trading Company Act, encourag-
ing the formation of joint ventures in the provision of export trading
services, and immunizing them from antitrust prosecution. 14 Two years
later, in 1984, encouragement for joint ventures was extended to encom-
pass joint ventures in research and development. The National Coopera-
tive Research Act declares that for antitrust purposes such R&D
alliances "shall not be deemed illegal per se." 15 In the same year, the
Justice Department signalled its receptiveness to joint ventures, even
those involving competitors in concentrated markets. 6 Indeed, some
have seized upon the Reagan administration's fondness for corporate
mergers and acquisitions' 7 as grounds for more favorable treatment of
corporate joint ventures. For example, Congressman Thomas Campbell,
11 Mosbacher Promises to Unveil Shortly Proposal on Production Joint Ventures, 57 ANTrrRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. 115 (July 27, 1989).
12 Jorde & Teece, supra note 8 at 36.
13 Id. at 33.
14 Export Trading Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. secs. 4001-4003 (1990).
15 National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. sees. 4301-4305 (1990).
16 Taylor, Joint Ventures Likely to Be Encouraged By Friendlier Attitude of U.S. Officials, Wall
St. J., Nov. 5, 1984, at 8.
17 See W. ADAMS AND J. BROCK, DANGEROUS PuRsurrs: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN
THE AGE OF WALL STREET, chapter 2 (1989); Adams & Brock, Reaganomics and the Transmogrifl-
cation of Merger Policy, 33 ANTITRUST BULL., 309 (1988).
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a former FTC official, rhetorically asks: "If firms can merge, why can
they not co-manufacture?"18
More recently, the Bush administration has proposed to accord even
more expansive encouragement for corporate alliances, by amending the
1984 Act to include joint ventures in the actual manufacture of products.
The Administration argues that such cooperative production agreements
"may be natural outgrowths, or indeed integral parts, of efficient joint
research and development."" At the same time, the House Judiciary
Committee has approved legislation expanding the 1984 National Coop-
erative Research Act to include joint ventures in production, to shield
these alliances from treble antitrust damages, and to direct that in any
assessment of the anticompetitiveness of joint production ventures "the
worldwide capacity of suppliers to provide a product, process, or service
shall be considered."
20
But should antitrust turn an increasingly blind eye toward corporate
alliances and joint ventures? Do cartels and market control flowing from
joint ventures constitute nothing more than antiquated, obsolete con-
cerns in the putative "new" age of global competition? Do corporate
partnerships enhance competitiveness or, beyond some threshold, do
they constitute an institutional superstructure for neutralizing and un-
dermining rivalry, domestic and international alike? At what point is
this threshold reached, and what momentum is unleashed once joint ven-
tures begin to proliferate?
This Article will analyze these questions. It shall do so by examin-
ing the nature, extent, growth and competitive consequences of joint ven-
tures in four major areas. First, the petroleum industry will be analyzed,
a field most prominently characterized by an elaborate web of joint ven-
tures, institutionalized on a global scale over a period of seven decades.
Next, will be automobiles, where joint ventures proliferated during the
1980s - as foreign competition exploded and cries for government im-
port protection mounted - although, as we will note, the Big Three
American firms participated in a particularly notable research "partner-
ship" throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Next, the focus is on airlines,
where trends toward corporate alliances have recently emerged and are
rapidly gaining momentum - especially between deregulated American
airlines and their foreign rivals. Then the Article examines the role joint
18 Government Role in Joint Production Ventures Hearing, supra note 6, at 13.
19 Bush Administration Unveils Proposal to Encourage Production Joint Ventures, 58 ANTrRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. 701 (May 10, 1990).
20 House Committee Clears Measures on Joint Ventures, Board Interlocks, 58 ANTrrRtusT &
TRADE REG. REP. 663 (May 3, 1990).
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ventures played in the massive, global cartel movement of the 1920s and
1930s. Finally, the conclusion will summarize some implications of the
analysis as it bears on the current rage for corporate partnerships and the
increasingly favorable policy treatment accorded them.
II. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
"No other industry begins to approach petroleum in the number
and importance of jointly owned enterprises," John Blair wrote in his
seminal study of the field.2 1
In oil, joint ventures between the world's largest firms have a long
history, both at home and abroad: First initiated in the 1920s, they sub-
sequently have multiplied world-wide, binding the oil giants together at
most of the industry's main stages: exploration, production, refining, and
pipeline transportation. In recent years, they have expanded to encom-
pass the nationalized oil operations of Middle Eastern nations. Not sur-
prisingly, joint ventures in petroleum have posed perennially vexing
public policy problems.
A. The Genesis of Joint Ventures
Joint petroleum ventures trace their origin to the desert sands of the
Middle East, where the world's leading oil companies sought to control
the region's huge crude deposits.
The first major joint venture was struck in 1928, when Exxon, Mo-
bil, British Petroleum and Shell joined together to create, and coopera-
tively own and operate over 70% of the Iraq Petroleum Company.2 2
Eight years later, two more oil giants, Standard Oil of California and
Texaco, combined to establish another Middle Eastern joint production
operation, Caltex, providing SoCal with a half interest in Texaco's mar-
keting operations east of Suez and compensating Texaco, in return, with
a half ownership stake in SoCal's Bahrein concessions.2 3
Thereafter, the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) was cre-
ated as a Saudi Arabian production venture, to be jointly owned and
operated by Exxon, Texaco, Mobil and SoCal (later Chevron);24 the Ku-
wait Oil Company was established as a joint venture, co-owned and co-
operated by Gulf and British Petroleum; while in Iran, the Iranian con-
sortium eventually encompassed Exxon, Texaco, Gulf, Chevron, Mobil,
21 J. BLAIR, THE CONTROL OF OIL 136 (1976).
22 Id. at 33.
23 Id. at 36.
24 Martin, The Petroleum Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 43 (W. Ad-
ams ed.) (8th ed. 1989).
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Shell and British Petroleum as joint venture partners.2 5 These alliances
included joint exploration, joint development and joint production; they
distributed income to the partners based on their ownership shares; and
they effected sales and transfers between the parent-partners.2 6
By 1952, the Federal Trade Commission found that joint ventures
between the world's largest petroleum irms had flourished. The FTC
reported that outside the United States, in the Middle East and else-
where, "the operations of the seven international petroleum companies
are combined through various inter-company holdings in subsidiary and
affiliated companies. These holdings constitute partnerships in various
areas of the world. Each of the companies has pyramids of subsidiary
and affiliated companies in which ownership is shared with one or more
of the other large companies."27
In the Middle East:
Jersey Standard [Exxon], Socony [Mobil], Royal Dutch-Shell, and Anglo-
Iranian [British Petroleum] are linked through their joint holdings in Iraq
Petroleum Co. and its nest of subsidiaries; Gulf and [British Petroleum]
jointly own Kuwait Oil; Standard of California and [Texaco] have many
joint relations through the California-Texas complex of companies and are
tied to [Exxon] and [Mobil] through Arabian American Oil Co. and Trans-
Arabian Pipe Line Co.
28
In Europe, "there is the California-Texas cluster of companies link-
ing together Standard of California and [Texaco]; [British Petroleum],
Royal Dutch-Shell, [Mobil], and [Exxon] jointly own Companhia Afri-
cana de Petroleo; while Gulf and [Exxon] are tied through their holdings
in United Petroleum Securities Corp."
29
In the Far East, the FTC found
a combination of [Exxon], [Mobil], [Texaco], Standard of California, and
Royal Dutch-Shell ... The California-Texas combine also operates in the
Far East, as does Standard-[Mobil], which is one of the important compa-
nies linking together [Exxon] and [Mobil]; and [British Petroleum] and
Royal Dutch-Shell jointly conduct extensive operations in the Far East as
well as Europe.30
And in Latin America, "a major complex of holdings links [Mobil],
Standard of California, and [Texaco]; while another brings together
25 IcL
26 Id. at 52.
27 The International Petroleum Cartel: StaffReport to the Federal Trade Commission, Submitted
to the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 29
(1952).
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[Exxon], Gulf, and Royal Dutch-Shell." 3 1
Outside the United States, largely as a result of their inordinate pro-
clivity for partnerships (see Table 1), the seven major petroleum compa-
nies by the early-1970s came to collectively account for upwards of 80%
of the Free World's oil supplies, including fully 90% of Middle East sup-
plies.32 In addition to joint ventures in crude production, the majors ex-
panded their partnerships to encompass joint marketing ventures, as well
as joint construction and operation of key pipeline facilities for transport-
ing crude oil and refined petroleum products.33
B. Institutionalization of Joint Ventures
In the United States, an equally elaborate network of alliances and
joint ventures has been promulgated, intertwining the integrated majors
in their bidding for leases, in their exploration activities, in their crude
production operations, and in their control of the nation's pipeline trans-
portation facilities.
In bidding for property leases, the oil giants have come to rely heav-
ily on joint ventures in the form of joint bidding for properties. That is,
instead of bidding independently against one another, they typically com-
bine to submit group bids. Table 2, compiled by energy expert John W.
Wilson in one of the most extensive investigations of oil joint ventures,
attests to the extensive reliance of the majors on joint bids. It shows, for
example, that during the period examined, Mobil submitted 8 independ-
ent bids and 103 joint bids; Amoco submitted 6 independent bids and 321
joint bids; Chevron submitted 79 independent bids and 108 joint bids;
while Gulf submitted 17 independent bids and 32 joint bids.
Further, the Senate Judiciary Committee has found that "[J]oint
bidding for leases almost invariably leads to joint production arrange-
ments," as the bidders typically carry their bidding alliances into the pro-
duction of crude oil from the properties on which they bid. 34 Table 3
demonstrates the prevalence of joint ventures in the case of offshore pro-
duction. But these production alliances are not limited to offshore pro-
duction alone. "Even onshore," the Senate Judiciary Committee has
31 Id.
32 Measday & Martin, The Petroleum Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY
42 (W. Adams ed.) (7th ed. 1986); J. BLAIR, supra note 21, at 52.
33 International Petroleum Cartel, supra note 27, at 27-28.
34 PETROLEUM INDUSTRY COMPETITION ACT OF 1976, S. REP. No. 1005, 94th Cong., 2nd
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TABLE 2
JOINT BIDDING IN FEDERAL OFFSHORE LEASE SALES
1970-1972
Number of Number of
Company Independent Bids Joint Bids
















Source: The Natural Gas Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monop-
oly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, part 1, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 481 (1973).
TABLE 3
JOINT OWNERSHIP OF FEDERAL OFFSHORE PRODUCING LEASES
Company Number of Leases Independently Owned

















Source: The Natural Gas Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monop-
oly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, part 1, 93rd Cong,. Ist Sess. 486-87 (1973).
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found, "a large amount of crude oil is produced jointly. ' 35 Tables 4 and
5 illustrate the prevalence of partnerships in onshore production, show-
ing the number of joint ventures between the oil majors in the oil-rich
Permian Basin of Texas and Louisiana.
TABLE 4
JOINT OWNERSHIP OF STATE OF LOUISIANA PETROLEUM
LEASES BY LARGE MAJOR PRODUCERS












































































































































































Source: The Natural Gas Industry: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, part 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 490 (1973) (Testi-
mony of John W. Wilson, Chief Division of Economic Studies, Federal Power Commission).
In addition, since the 1950s, the integrated majors have banded to-
gether to construct, and to jointly own and operate, most of the nation's
crude and petroleum product pipelines.36 As a result, the majors have
come to control approximately 90% of all U.S. pipeline systems.a7 And
as Tables 6 and 7 document, the bulk of the nation's pipelines are con-
trolled by alliances between the integrated majors, including Colonial
(the nation's largest refined product pipeline, stretching from the Gulf
36 See generally, Adams & Brock, Deregulation or Divestiture: The Case of Petroleum Pipelines,
19 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 705 (1983).
37 Id. at 711.
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TABLE 6
JOINT VENTURES: CRUDE PIPELINES
Pipeline
Arapahoe Pipe Line Co.
Butte Pipe Line Co.
Capline
Chicap Pipe Line Co.
Cook Inlet Pipe Line Co.
Explorer Pipeline Co.
Kaw Pipe Line Co.
Kenai Pipe Line Co.
Mid-Valley Pipeline Co.
Osage Pipeline Co.








































































































Joint Ventures, Antitrust, and Transnational Cartelization
11:433(1991)
TABLE 6 (CONTINUED)
Diamond Shamrock Corp. 7.0
Midland Coops. 9.0
Phillips 42.4
Southcap Pipeline Co. Union 50%
Clark 50
Tecumseh Pipe Line Co. Atlantic Richfield 40%
Union 40
Ashland 20




Texoma Pipe Line Co. Kerr-McGee 10.1%
Lion (Tosco) 5.0
Mobil 10.1





Western Crude Oil 20.0
Texas Eastern Transmission 5.0












Standard Oil (Ohio) 9.2
Source: Adams & Brock, Deregulation or Divestiture: The Case of Petroleum Pipelines, 19
Wake Forest Law Rev. 705, 714-716 (1983).
Coast, through the southeastern United States, and terminating in New
York), the Olympic, the Explorer and the Capline pipelines, as well as
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. Overall, eleven of the twenty largest
U.S. pipelines systems are owned and operated as joint ventures between
the major oil companies, with jointly owned pipelines accounting for
three-quarters of total national pipeline capacity.1
8
Finally, alliances in oil have been expanded in recent years to in-
clude joint ventures between the international oil majors and state-owned
producers in the Middle East. Kuwait, for example, has acquired a 22%
38 Petroleum Pipeline Regulatory Reform Bill: Hearings on S. 1626 Before the Subcomm. on
Energy Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31
(1982).
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TABLE 7
JOINT VENTURES: REFINED PRODUCT PIPELINES
Ownership
Company Parent Share














Lake Charles Pipe Line Co. Continental 50%
Cities Service 50
Laurel Pipeline Co. Gulf 49.1%
Texaco 33.9
BP 17.0
Olympic Pipe Line Co. Shell 43.5%
Mobil 29.5
Texaco 27.0
Plantation Pipe Line Co. Exxon 48.8%
Standard Oil (Cal.) 27.1
Shell 24.0












Wyco Pipe Line Co. Amoco 40%
Texaco 40
Mobil 20




Source: Adams & Brock, Deregulation or Divestiture: The Case of Petroleum Pipelines, 19
Wake Forest Law Rev. 705, 716-717 (1983).
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equity interest in British Petroleum, while Venezuela has utilized joint
ventures to secure partial ownership stakes in refineries in West Ger-
many, Sweden, Belgium, and the United States.39 Other examples in-
clude the Pemref joint refining venture between Mobil Oil and the Saudi
government, the Yanbu petrochemical joint venture between Mobil and
the Saudi government," and the Al-Jubail petrochemical joint venture
between Exxon and the Saudi government.41 And in 1988, Aramco, act-
ing on behalf of the Saudi government, expended $800 million to
purchase half ownership in Texaco's American refining and marketing
operations in 23 eastern and Gulf Coast states, including three Texaco
refinery facilities (one of which is the largest in the world), as well as
some 11,000 gasoline stations.42
C. Public Policy Issues
In oil, then, joint ventures - joint-bidding, joint-production, joint-
ownership, joint-refining, joint-pipelining - organizationally conjoin the
world's largest producers, encompass virtually every major stage of the
industry, and reach into virtually every corner of the globe. But in their
scope and magnitude, joint ventures in oil raise a host of disturbing ques-
tions.
First, are these joint ventures composed of small firms forced to
combine with one another in a desperate struggle to meet the industry's
minimum capital requirements? Clearly, they are petroleum giants rank-
ing among the very largest of all industrial concerns, not just in the
United States, but worldwide. Four of the world's ten largest industrial
firms, and six of the twenty largest, are oil companies;43 in the United
States, four of the country's ten largest industrial firms, and nine of the
twenty largest, are oil companies.' As Table 8 attests, the ten largest oil
companies have combined sales of $334 billion, combined profits of $16.8
billion, and combined assets of $335 billion. In fact, the top twenty oil
giants together accounted for fully 83% of the increase in net income
recorded for all Fortune 500 firms combined in the 1979-1980 period45
39 Martin, supra note 24, at 55.
40 MOBIL CORP., 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1985).
41 ExXON CORP., 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1984).
42 Tanner, Saudis Sign With Texaco for Venture in U.S. in Bid to Become Major Refiner, Wall St.
J., Nov. 11, 1988, at C13.
43 The International 500, FORTUNE, July 31, 1989, at 282 (ranking includes Conoco as a subsid-
iary of DuPont).
44 The Fortune 500, FORTUNE, Apr. 23, 1990, at 346 (ranking includes Conoco as a subsidiary
of DuPont, and Marathon as a subsidiary of USX).
45 SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
449
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TABLE 8
FINANCIAL PROFILES OF THE TEN
LARGEST U.S. PETROLEUM CORPORATIONS*
Company Sales Profits Assets
Exxon $ 86.6 $ 3.5 $ 83.2
Mobil 51.0 1.8 39.1
Conoco/DuPont 35.2 2.5 34.7
Texaco 32.4 2.4 25.6
Chevron 29.4 0.3 33.9
Amoco 24.2 1.6 30.4
Shell-USA 21.7 1.4 27.6
Occidental 20.1 0.3 20.7
Marathon/USX 17.8 1.0 17.5
ARCO 15.9 2.0 22.3
Totals $334.3 $16.8 $335.0
* Sales, profits and assets in billions.
Source: The Fortune 500, FORTUNE, Apr. 23, 1990, at 346.
evidence scarcely indicative of suboptimal size or inadequate cash flow.
Second, is the pervasiveness of alliances and joint ventures attributa-
ble solely to the industry's massive capital requirements? Granted, some
offshore oil tracts and pipeline projects may be expensive. But does this
necessitate that the same firms persistently join with one another to bid
on all offshore tracts, and that they combine together to construct virtu-
ally all pipeline systems, and that they jointly operate virtually all major
fields in the U.S. and throughout the rest of the world?
Realistically, the extreme degree of corporate alliances can hardly
be attributed to the need to balance risk, when some 90% of the most
risky wells - "wildcat" wells not associated with known deposits of oil
and gas - are drilled by small independent operators46 (whose efficiency
in this activity may be significantly greater than that of the integrated
majors).47
Moreover, the multi-billions of dollars spent by the oil giants on
COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., 1ST SEss., THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROFITS:
THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY WITHIN THE FORTUNE 500, 1978-80 14 (Comm. Print 1981).
46 See Thurow, Buoyed by High Prices, Vexed by Government, Oilman Keeps Drilling, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 22, 1980, at 1; R. SHERRILL, THE OIL FOLLIES OF 1970-1980 62 (1983); Newport, Get Ready
For the Coming Oil Crisis, FORTUNE, Mar. 16, 1987, at 51.
47 See Nulty, The New Breed of Wildcatters, FORTUNE, Sept. 28, 1987, at 111.
In a related vein, it is important to note that Exxon, the largest and most vertically integrated of
the oil giants, has vigorously and repeatedly denied before state tax commissions that (in Exxon's
words) its production, refining, marketing and transportation operations "are integral parts of a
unitary business composed of all functions combined; rather... each function is independent and not
unitary to, or an integral part of any other function." See Adams, Vertical Divestiture of the Petro-
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mergers and acquisitions in recent years - an estimated cumulative
amount of $26.6 billion in the four-year period 1978-1981 alone,4 8 and
including such unrelated acquisitions as Mobil's $1.5 billion purchase of
the Montgomery Ward retail chain, Exxon's $613 million purchase of
Reliance Electric, Occidental Petroleum's $795 million purchase of Iowa
Beef Processors, Sohio's $1.8 billion purchase of Kennecott Copper, and
ARCO's $2.0 billion purchase of Anaconda Mining4 9 - represent enor-
mous amounts of capital obviously not required by the majors in their
ongoing oil operations. Such discretionary capital spending outside the
industry would seem to negate the claim that joint ventures are impera-
tive for survival in this highly capital-intensive industry.
Third, has this extensive, long-established network of joint ventures
served to enhance American energy security or has it had the opposite
effect? For example, did the Iraq Consortium's deliberate suppression of
crude discoveries over three decades, in order to keep these additional
supplies off the world market, contribute to American energy security in
any way?50 Did the huge monopoly profits reaped by the oil giants in
their Middle East joint production ventures not antagonize OPEC gov-
ernments, and eventually embolden them to take retaliatory action?5"
Did the majors' collective machinations to control the flow of oil into the
world market - including their collective allocations of production cut-
backs among Middle East nations - not significantly contribute to
OPEC animosity?52 Indeed, have Big Oil's joint ventures not in and of
themselves strengthened OPEC, and facilitated its survival, by (in the
words of the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence) providing
"a cartel-like marketing mechanism that allows easy pass-through of
leum Majors: An Affirmative Case, 30 VAND. L. REv. 1115, at 1140-41 (1977), and the sources cited
therein. (emphasis added)
48 STAFF REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., 2ND SESS., MERGERS AND ACQUI-
SITIONS OF THE TOP OIL COMPANIES, 1978-81 23 (1982).
49 For an extensive list of oil company acquisitions, see Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Procedures
Amendments Act: Hearing on HR. 586 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1989) (prepared statement of Waiter
Adams and James W. Brock).
50 Blair, supra note 21, at 84-85.
51 "Dr. Nadim Pachachi, secretary-general of OPEC, pointed out that the Western-owned Iraq
Petroleum Company had annual returns on investment of 56.6 percent between 1952 and 1963, that
the Arabian-American Oil Company had 61 percent returns on investment annually from 1956 to
1960; the Iran Consortium, 69 percent returns from 1959 to 1964; and that the average annual rate
of return on investments in the Middle East from 1948 to 1960 was 67 percent." Sherrill, supra note
46, at 133. See also F. COOK, THE GREAT ENERGY SCAM 84 (1982).
52 For a detailed examination, see MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 93RD CONG., 2ND SESS. 105, 115-117 (1975).
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crude oil price increases" and providing "crucial expertise to keep na-
tional [OPEC] oil companies operating effectively"? 5 3 Most generally,
did the long-established, elaborate network of joint ventures enable the
majors to avoid the recurrent energy crises that wracked the nation dur-
ing the decade of the 1970s? And does the very fact of the frequency of
these crises not cast serious doubt on the efficacy of joint ventures be-
tween the oil giants?
Fourth, is it realistic to expect that joint ventures between the oil
giants will promote technological progress in the development and com-
mercialization of alternative fuels which, in turn, would lessen American
dependence on geopolitically volatile foreign supplies? Or are they more
likely to retard innovation in alternative energies in order to maximize
the value of the majors' vast holdings of crude and reserves?
The question is not academic. In the 1920s, the German chemical
combine IG Farben made a spectacular breakthrough that enabled it to
produce synthetic gasoline from coal. But in 1929, pursuant to an infa-
mous "marriage" agreement, Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon)
and Shell obtained worldwide ownership and control (except for Ger-
many) of Farben's synthetic fuel technology. Exxon's objective was
something other than the promotion of this synthetic gasoline technology
at the expense of its crude oil assets. According to a Twentieth Century
Fund study, the manner in which Exxon used its rights "shows clearly
that its main object in acquiring them was to strengthen its control over
the oil industry .... Standard and Shell did little to encourage wide-
spread synthetic production of liquid fuels and lubricants from coal.
They had acquired these processes primarily to protect their own vast
interests in petroleum." A former Exxon president conceded as much in
an internal company document: "There is little doubt in our minds," he
wrote, "but what, if other than oil companies had dominated the situa-
tion, the management's conduct of the business would have been along
lines better calculated to secure the maximum return on the capital
invested."54
Nor can this be dismissed as an artifact of ancient history. In the
1970s, in a company document recently uncovered by Canadian antitrust
authorities, an official of an Exxon subsidiary summarized the firm's
strategy of restraint toward alternative fuels technology: "It is therefore
desirable for [Exxon] to do research work on shale and coal to know
53 Quoted in Sherrill, supra note 46, at 487. For recent evidence of the ongoing symbiotic rela-
tionship between the oil majors and OPEC, see Rothschild & Emerson, Born Again Cartel, NEw
REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1984, at 20-25.
54 G. STOCKING AND M. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION 91-93, 491-95 (1946).
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where the processes are headed.... In the meantime, it should not itself
initiate commercial production, or take other action or make announce-
ments that would motivate other companies to initiate commercial pro-
duction or even development."55 Asked if his coal subsidiary would
compete against his oil operations, a vice president of Conoco - which
in addition to its oil operations is also one of the nation's largest coal
producers - insisted before a Congressional committee: "No, sir, under
no circumstances," adding, "We would not direct a coal subsidiary, a
nuclear subsidiary, to have its price changed, modified in any way so as
to either compete readily against or not compete against another form of
energy... We are not going to play one source of energy against the
other."56 The purpose, it seems, is not promotion of alternative fuels
technologies but their suppression.
Finally, have six decades of corporate partnerships in oil enhanced
competition, or have they squelched it on a global basis? In their alli-
ances abroad, for example, the majors' joint production ventures soon led
to an extensive set of cartel pacts fixing output quotas and prices, and
apportioning market shares - not only in crude production, but for re-
fined products as well.5
In their joint bidding for leases, Professor Walter Mead points out
that "it is obvious that when four firms ... each able to bid indepen-
dently, combine to submit a single bid, three interested, potential bidders
have been eliminated; i.e., the combination has restrained trade." This
situation, he argues, "does not differ materially from one of explicit col-
lusion in which four firms meet in advance of a given sale and decide who
among them should bid (which three should refrain from bidding) for
specific leases and, instead of competing among themselves, attempt to
rotate the winning bids."58
Pipeline joint ventures are rife with anticompetitive consequences.
55 Quoted in Mintz, Synfuel Development Delay Laid to Exxon, Wash. Post, Aug. 11, 1981, at
A2.
56 Quoted in Sherrill, supra note 46, at 319. It is especially significant in this regard to note that
the oil majors have come to dominate other energy sources, including coal, uranium, and solar
energy. See Cartel Restriction Act Hearings Before Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 190-91, 250-57
(1981). These statistics show that oil companies control six of the fifteen largest coal producers, and
rank as six of the ten largest holders of uranium reserves. In addition, by the early 1980s, oil firms
were estimated to control possibly as much as 90% of the solar energy field. Nag, Big Oil's Push Into
Solar Irks Independents, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1980, at 23.
57 Blair, supra note 21, at 54, 57. See generally, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CARTEL RE-
PORT, supra note 27.
58 Mead, The Competitive Significance of Joint Ventures, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 839 (1967). For
additional statistical evidence confirming this conclusion, see LEONARD W. WEISS, CONCENTRA-
TION AND PRICE 72-74 (1989).
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They enable the oil giants to collectively allocate production and markets
between themselves, in accordance with their ownership shares, and em-
power them collectively to control the industry by controlling the flows
of crude oil and refined petroleum products to independent non-partners
as well as among themselves.59 In its landmark report, the Senate Sub-
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly found:
Integrated company ownership of petroleum pipelines has had a substantial
impact on the ability of nonintegrated refiners and marketers to compete
with the pipeline owners in the marketplace for petroleum products. Con-
trol of crude oil pipelines has enabled these vertically integrated oil compa-
nies to gain control of crude oil production greatly exceeding their own
refinery needs and has worked to prevent the formation of a domestic crude
oil market. Their operation of petroleum pipelines allows them to control
the distribution and flow - and consequently influence the price - of re-
fined petroleum products. 
60
The Subcommittee reported that the integrated majors' collective control
of pipelines enables them "to discriminate against independent producers
and deprive them of a market for oil," to "discriminate against independ-
ent refiners by depriving them of access to crude," and to "determine the
disposition of a large portion of refined product and limit the competitive
marketing behavior of independent refiners and marketers."61
More generally, this extensive network of alliances necessitates an
unparalleled degree of continuous fraternization among competitor-part-
ners, including sharing their most intimate pricing plans, marketing
objectives, and long term corporate strategies.62 In the case of foreign
59 For a detailed analysis of these anticompetitive problems, see Adams & Brock, supra note 36.
60 STAFF REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2ND SESS., OIL COMPANY OWNERSHIP OF PIPELINES 151 (1978).
61 Id. at 9. An internal Exxon study of the California petroleum market explains that an "im-
portant factor that contributes to control of prices by the large purchasers is the absence of common
carrier pipeline facilities. This reduces the producer's flexibility in marketing his production."
Quoted in Appellant Brief, City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., at 18, n. 47 (9th Cir.
1988).
62 M.A. Adelman, a renowned expert on the world petroleum industry, explains how the ex-
change of information and the coordination of production plans among the eight large firms partici-
pating in Middle East joint ventures during the decades following World War II impacted
competition:
For example, each Aramco offtaker becomes aware of the nominations of the others, and knows
in advance what they intend to sell. Since Aramco nominations are one-year firm and three-
years tentative, each offtaker has not only a precise idea of his partners' short-run plans but at
least a good idea of their long-run plans for permanent expansion. Compounding this effect is
the overlapping membership in joint ventures. If the production plans of, say, Gulf are known
to its partner BP, they presumably must also be known to BP's partners in IPC. Therefore the
others can at least get a good idea of the net impact of the Gulf plans. Two of BP's partners in
IPC are Esso and Mobil; hence the plans of Gulf and of BP must presumably be known also by
SoCal and Texaco. All these firms are in the Iranian Consortium which includes practically
everybody else in the Middle East. As a result, each of the Persian Gulf producing companies
takes account of the action of all others. It would be an exaggeration to say that the companies
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joint ventures, the Federal Trade Commission long ago found that such
"a maze of joint ownership obviously provides opportunity, and even ne-
cessity, for joint action. With joint decision-making thus concentrated in
the hands of a small number of persons, a common policy may be easily
enforced."6 3 Likewise, in pipeline joint ventures, a "company that takes
30 percent of a million-barrels-a-day product pipeline... is notifying its
competitor-partners that it intends to supply 300,000 barrels a day for
the next 30 or 40 years in the pipeline delivery territory. The partners, in
turn, are revealing their long-range future plans."'  In pricing also, the
oil giants systematically exchange information and plans among them-
selves. They regularly inform one another of their pricing intentions,
their reasons for planned price changes, and their price forecasts.65 Even
the Wall Street Journal expresses astonishment at the evidence of "an
industry so clubby and inbred that executives considered it bad manners
to compete too aggressively with each other in price."6 6
confer on their production plans. At least among the five American companies, antitrust pru-
dence would not permit that. But each can be assured that nothing is contemplated to threaten
an excess of supply and a threat to the price. Each can hold back on output in the almost
certain knowledge that all others are doing the same.
M. ADELMAN, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET 88 (1972).
63 INTERNATIONAL CARTEL REPORT, supra note 27, at 29.
64 Measday, The Petroleum Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 150 (W.
Adams ed.) (5th ed. 1977).
65 Brief of the Appellants, Appeal from Summary Judgments, City of Long Beach v. Standard
Oil of Calif., at 24 (9th Cir. Feb. 1988).
66 Jackson & Pasztor, Court Records Show Big Oil Companies Exchanged Price Data, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 17, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
The Ninth Circuit Court's recent opinion, reinstating Sherman Act charges against virtually all
of the major petroleum companies, is replete with evidence which the court itself has found to be
plausibly suggestive of anticompetitive oligopolistic parallelism. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Pro-
ceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, No. 86-6776 (9th Cir., June 22, 1990).
For example, a Chevron official provided the following explanation of his firm's extraordinary
efforts to alert other oil companies to its price changes:
Q. ... Was there any business reason why the temporary dealer assistance that was being
granted in the trade zone.., should have been published or made available to anybody other
than the dealers?
A. Yes, I think a practical business reason. If we had raised our prices to our dealers, and our
dealers had raised it on the street generally, I think particularly our dealers... may have been
as much as one, two, three, four cents - they were all over the lot. If a competitor saw this, he
might wonder, "Is this a dealer movement, or has [Chevron] raised their prices to cause this




Similarly, the court found plausible evidence suggesting that the major companies jointly acted
to artificially reduce their rate of capacity growth, in order to sustain higher price levels and to
handicap less-disciplined independents:
The evidence supports the conclusions that (I) in the early 1970s several of the appellees began
taking steps to reduce excess capacity; (2) they did so with the intent and effect of reducing the
strength of the independent sector of the market; (3) during this period the appellees exchanged
455
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Joint ventures in oil may have proliferated to the point where they
are no longer supplements to the competitive market, but a complete re-
placement for it. Alliances may supercede individual corporate auton-
omy, where "collaboration" becomes collusion, and where "cooperation"
is tantamount to collective control. If so, what mechanism is there to
insure that the public interest will be vouchsafed, or that the partners'
decisionmaking will promote the nation's energy interests?
III. THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
The automobile industry, a long-entrenched American oligopoly,
has responded to the first serious competition in four decades by spinning
an extensive web of joint ventures, encompassing virtually all of its major
rivals abroad.
A. The Postwar Oligopoly
The automobile industry has been one of the most concentrated of
all major U.S. industries. In the post-World War II era, the Big Three -
General Motors, Ford and Chrysler - generally accounted for 90% or
more of U.S. auto production; until recently, they controlled an approxi-
mately equivalent share of U.S. auto sales.67
The industry exhibited all the defects of oligopolistic mutual inter-
dependence and competitive forebearance. Prices were uniformly rigid
except in an upward direction, with genuine price competition virtually
nonexistent. In its massive 1958 investigation of the industry, the Senate
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly found "substantial identity of
prices among the Big Three at each price level," the "exercise by GM of
leadership in prices" and, generally, an established pattern in which price
competition had been "deemphasized" in favor of noncompetitive price
conformity.68
information concerning supply forecasts and production levels, and (4) the shortage of refining
capacity, as well as the foreign activities of several of the appellees (discussed below), resulted in
supply shortages and upward price pressure.
Id. at 6519.
As alluded to in the preceding conclusions, the court also found plausible evidence that the
major oil companies, acting through their joint production Middle East ventures, conspired to resist
Iranian and Saudi Arabian efforts to increase crude oil production, and to thereby further artificially
hold down market supplies. Id. at 6522.
67 See Adams & Brock, The Automobile Industry, in THE STRUcTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY
104-106 (W. Adams ed.) (8th ed. 1989).
68 Administered Prices, Automobiles: Report of the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, 177 (1958). These findings were recon-
firmed over fifteen years later. See Boyle & Hogarty, Pricing Behavior in the American Automobile
Industry, 24 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 81 (1975).
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Production inefficiency flourished in this noncompetitive milieu.
Legendary GM chairman Alfred Sloan long ago lamented the fact that
"[i]n practically all our activities we seem to suffer from the inertia re-
sulting from our great size.... I can't help but feel that General Motors
has missed a lot by reason of this inertia."69 GM president Elliott M.
Estes later confided that "Chevrolet is such a big monster that you twist
its tail and nothing happens at the other end for months and months. It
is so gigantic that there isn't any way to really run it. You just sort of try
to keep track of it."70 As a result of antediluvian materials procurement
practices, bloated overhead expenses, and general mismanagement of
production processes,71 the American auto oligopoly, by the early-1980s,
suffered a per-car production cost disadvantage of $1,700 vis-a-vis Japa-
nese auto firms.72
Technological progress languished also. Summarizing the indus-
try's post-war performance, David Halberstam writes:
Since competition within the [U.S.] auto industry was mild, there was no
impulse to innovate.... Why bother, after all? In America's rush to be-
come a middle-class society, there was an almost insatiable demand for
cars.... It was impossible not to make money.... So there was little
stress on improving the cars. From 1949, when the automatic transmission
was introduced, to the late seventies, the cars remained remarkably the
same. What innovation there was came almost reluctantly. 73
In this era, veteran industry expert Brock Yates points out, foreign pro-
ducers "continued to move ahead with fuel injection, disc brakes, rack
and pinion steering, radial tires, quartz headlights, stalk-mounted wind-
shield wiper and dimmer controls, ergonomically adjustable bucket seats,
five-speed manual transmissions, high-efficiency overhead camshaft en-
gines, independently sprung suspensions, advanced shock absorbers, and
strict crash-worthiness standards." 74
Perhaps H. Ross Perot, founder of the EDS Corporation and erst-
while director of General Motors, has best summarized the industry's
noncompetitive performance during the post-World War II era:
General Motors and the entire American automobile industry had a big
69 Quoted in U.S. Congress. Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation of Concen-
tration of Economic Power, monograph no. 13, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 130-31 (1941).
70 Quoted in J. WRIGHT, ON A CLEAR DAY You CAN SEE GENERAL MOTORS 100 (1979).
71 See Adams & Brock, The Automobile Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY
146-49 (7th ed. 1986).
72 U.S. Department of Transportation, THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY: 1981 15 (1982).
73 D. HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING 244-45 (1986). For example, when reporters broached
the then novel notion of front-wheel drive with Lee Iacocca in the early 1970s, he retorted: "I say,
give 'em leather. They can smell it." Quoted in iL at 385.
74 YATES, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 149 (1984).
See generally Adams & Brock, supra note 67.
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respite from competition.... [I]t got so bad that [U.S. auto firms] tried to
get divisions to compete with one another - Chevrolet compete with Pon-
tiac, Oldsmobile with Buick, and so on.... I say 'Fellows, that's intramu-
ral sports.... You don't even tackle there, you just touch the guy.... You
don't even play with pads. . . ' First board meeting ... I gave 'em my
immigrant's view of General Motors. And I said, 'You don't understand
competition....'75
B. Competitive Interlude
In the 1970s, the unthinkable happened: Competition swept
through the industry, and eroded this noncompetitive environment.
Spearheaded by the Japanese, foreign firms offered American consumers
innovative, high quality, fuel efficient models at attractive prices.
The impact on the Big Three was dramatic: Foreign firms' share of
the American market tripled, climbing from 6% in the mid-1950s to
18% in 1975, and continuing to rise thereafter, reaching nearly 30% by
1982.76 Inundated with a flood of superior foreign automobiles (and ag-
gravated by a severe economic recession), General Motors and Ford col-
lectively lost $5 billion in the 1980-1981 period," while Chrysler was
rescued from bankruptcy only by virtue of a $1.5 billion government
bailout.78
In 1981, in response to urgent pleas from the domestic industry,7 9
the United States government imposed "voluntary" quotas to restrict
Japanese imports. In spite of this protection, however, the domestic oli-
gopoly was compelled to invest billions to begin to modernize its anti-
quated plants and production facilities. It was forced to boost its
productivity by as much as 30 to 40%. s0 It was compelled to slash bil-
lions of dollars in costs.8" And it was finally forced to begin to substan-
tially - some say "tremendously" - improve the quality of its
products.82
C. The Advent of Joint Ventures
The ostensible purpose of the "voluntary" quotas was to give the
75 Interview, Washington Post, July 7, 1985.
76 Automotive News, 1990 MARKET DATA BOOK 40 (1990).
77 GENERAL MOTORS, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 48 (1989); FORD MOTOR CO., 1984 ANNUAL
REPORT 40 (1985).
78 See W. ADAMS & J. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX 297-303 (1986).
79 See Adams & Brock, supra note 67, at 122-23.
80 HARBOUR & ASSOC., THE HARBOUR REPORT: A DECADE LATER 104-137 (1990).
81 See eg., FORD MOTOR CO., 1984 ANNUAL REPORT at 19 (indicating that the firm had cut its
operating costs by $4.5 billion between 1979 and 1984).
82 HARBOUR REPORT, supra note 80, at 143-45.
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Big Three a three year period of "breathing space" which would enable
them to modernize their facilities and put them in a position to compete
more effectively against foreign firms in the United States market. In
1984, the "voluntary" quotas were renewed, affording the Big Three
three additional years of "breathing space." Soon it became apparent,
however, that the Big Three used the prolonged period of protection, not
to compete but to forge a complex maze of transnational joint ventures
with virtually all of their major foreign rivals. The magnitude and
breadth of these global alliances is detailed in Figure 1.
General Motors, the world's largest automobile firm, joined with
Toyota in 1983 - the world's third largest vehicle producer and the larg-
est importer of cars into the United States market - to jointly produce
automobiles in California."3 Subsequently, GM and Toyota agreed to
merge their previously separate production facilities in Australia, creat-
ing that nation's largest automotive manufacturing operation in the pro-
cess." GM also acquired a 40% ownership stake in the Japanese Isuzu
firm, and imported Spectrum models produced by Isuzu. 5 GM now
holds a substantial financial interest in Japan's Suzuki, imports Sprint/
GEO automobiles produced by Suzuki86 and, in 1986, announced a joint
venture with Suzuki to produce automobiles in Canada. GM also owns
50% of Daewoo, a South Korean automaker, and since 1984 has jointly
produced the Pontiac LeMans with Suzuki and imported it into the
United States market.8 7 In 1986, GM purchased a 60% stake in the Brit-
ish Lotus firm; in 1989, it disclosed the acquisition of half ownershp in
Sweden's SAAB automotive manufacturer.88
Similarly, Ford Motor Company, the world's second largest auto-
motive firm, acquired a 25% ownership stake in Japan's Mazda; it en-
tered into purchase agreements with Mazda for a variety of automotive
parts and components;8 9 it jointly constructed an automobile factory in
Mexico with Mazda;90 and it now purchases approximately half the cars
produced at Mazda's Flat Rock, Michigan assembly plant.91 Ford also
83 For rankings, see Automotive News, 1990 MARKET DATA BOOK 6, 27 (1990). On the GM-
Toyota joint venture, see Adams & Brock, supra note 67, at 106.
84 Davis, GM and Toyota to Merge Subsidiaries in Australia, AUTO. NEWS, Dec. 14, 1987, at 2.
85 Flint, Make Love, Not War, FORBES, Oct. 2, 1989, at 48; GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 1988
ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1989).
86 Id.
87 Id
88 Judge, G.M. to Buy Half ofSaab Car Unit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1989, at 19.
89 Industrial Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. Part 3, at 164 (1983).
90 Holusha, Detroit's New Japan Strategy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1985, at D4, col. 4.
91 Adams & Brock, supra note 67, at 105-107.
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agreed to produce automobiles which Mazda plans to market under its
own nameplate,92 and the two firms have disclosed exploratory discus-
sions involving their potential joint production of automobiles in West
Germany.93 In addition, Ford and Mazda collectively entered into joint
production and purchase agreements with the emerging South Korean
automotive firm Kia (a company in which Mazda holds a 25% equity
interest). Ford also announced plans to import mini-cars manufactured
by Kia into the United States. 94 At the same time, Ford and Volkswagen
have combined their Latin American production operations into a joint
venture which, standing alone, constitutes the world's 1 lth largest auto-
mobile manufacturing concern;95 the two firms are also engaged in dis-
cussions aimed at co-production of mini-vans in Europe.96 Ford and
Nissan have disclosed cooperative ventures to jointly produce mini-
vans97 and four-wheel-drive sport vehicles.98
Chrysler, too, has forged an elaborate network of alliances with its
foreign rivals. It holds a 22% ownership stake in Japan's Mitsubishi,
and the two firms co-produce automobiles in their jointly owned Dia-
mond-Star Motors facility, located in Bloomington, Illinois.99 Mitsub-
ishi, in turn, has taken a 15% equity interest in South Korea's Hyundai
Motor Company." 0 Chrysler has entered into a parts-procurement ven-
ture with the South Korean Samsung Group; Samsung has disclosed
plans to eventually produce complete automobiles for Chrysler. 101
Chrysler has undertaken to produce automobiles with Maserati,10 2 and
has engine purchase agreements with Volkswagen and France's
Peugeot.1"3 In addition, Chrysler has joined with Japan's Honda to dis-
92 Levin, Ford Plant to Build New Vehicle for Mazda, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1990 at Cl.
93 Johnson, Ford Explores European Projects with Mazda, VW, AuTMoTIVE NEWS, June 25,
1990, at 54.
94 Ford Korean Import is Seen, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1985, at D4, col. 6.
95 Ryser, Ford and VW A Marriage of Convenience, Bus. WK., Dec. 8, 1986, at 53.
96 Ford Explores European Projects, supra note 93.
97 Holusha, Ford Will Join Nissan to Build a Mini-Van, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1988, at 33.
98 Johnson, Ford and Nissan Will Build Sport-Utility in Spain, AuTromoIVE NEws, July 24,
1989, at 6.
99 ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 67, at 106.
100 Kanabayashi, Japan is Wooing Auto Concerns in South Korea, Wall St. J., July 17, 1985, at 34,
col. I. Mitsubishi has subsequently disclosed a joint production venture with Volvo, and Volvo and
Renault have exchanged ownership stakes in each other. Kapstein, Mitsubishi is taking a back road
into Europe, Bus. Wk., Nov. 19, 1990 at 64.
101 Industrial Policy Hearings, supra note 89, at 164; Going Global: Despite Pleas for Curbs on
Imports, U.S. Auto Makers Rapidly Expand Foreign Ties, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 15, col. 2.
102 Chrysler Pact with Maserati, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1986, at D9, col. 2.
103 Industrial Policy Hearings, supra note 89, at 164; U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
PUB. No. 1110, CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES AND CERTAIN CHASSIS AND BODIES THEREFOR A-20
(INv. No. TA-201-44) (Dec. 1980).
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tribute and market jeeps in Japan - this following Chrysler's 1987 ac-
quisition of AMC-Jeep.104 As Chrysler describes its network of alliances,
Mitsubishi
... provides us with vehicles and sells us 400,000 or so V-6 engines per
year. Diamond-Star Motors, our joint venture assembly plant with Mitsub-
ishi, produces Lasers and Talons. From Hyundai, Korea's largest automo-
bile company, we plan to purchase a mid-size sedan to sell through our
Eagle dealers starting in 1991. Renault of France supplies V-6 engines for
our Eagle Premier and Dodge Monaco. We recently initiated a joint ven-
ture with Renault to build a small utility vehicle... for production in Spain
and sale in Europe jointly by Chrysler and Renault .... We will soon be
distributing the Alfa Romeo 164 in the United States through a joint ven-
ture with Fiat.105
Finally, in an unprecedented development, General Motors and
Chrysler in 1990 announced plans to jointly produce automotive parts,
thus establishing the first manufacturing joint venture directly linking
Big Three firms.10
6
Considered en masse, the reach and density of these automotive
partnerships are staggering. "What's the connection between Porsche
and Suzuki?" asks the London Economist. "Well, Volkswagen's Audi
division assembles some Porsches; VW has a Brazilian carmaking joint
venture with Ford; Ford is working with Nissan to develop a new Ameri-
can minivan; Nissan owns 5% of Fuji Heavy Industries (which makes
Subaru cars); Subaru has a joint-venture car plant in America with
Isuzu; General Motors owns 38% of Isuzu - and GM owns 5% of
Suzuki. Phew."' 7 Or, as Congressman Richard Durbin puts it, "It used
to be 'us' vs. 'them'... Now... [w]e don't know who is 'us' and who is
'them'." 10 8
D. Public Policy Issues
This proliferation of joint ventures between the domestic auto oli-
gopoly and its major foreign rivals raises a number of troubling
questions.
First, the crux of the industry's deplorable post-war performance
seems ultimately rooted in its oligopolistic giantism and bureaucratic
104 Chrysler Pact with Honda to Sell Jeeps, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1990, at 19.
105 CHRYSLER CORP., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 10-11 (1990).
106 See Stertz, GM, Chrysler Sign an Agreement to Make Key Automotive Parts Jointly in the U.S.,
Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1989, at A3; and Levin, G.M. and Chrysler Plan Joint Venture, N.Y. Times, Feb.
7, 1990, at C5.
107 Spot the Difference, ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 1990, at 74.
108 Quoted in Shribman & Pine, Auto-Industry Lobbying to Retain Japan Quotas Hasn't Been as
Intense, or Successful, as in 1984, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1985, at 54, col. 1.
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bloat 9 - afflictions that joint ventures are congenitally incapable of
remedying. Observing that General Motors' employment exceeds that of
the three largest Japanese auto firms combined, the Economist concludes
that "GM's centralised, bureaucratic ways make it too inflexible in a
market in which the Japanese can produce new models every three years
and can re-program their plants in a jiffy to respond to shifting demand.
GM's committee-designed models are out of date years before they reach
the streets."" For its part, Fortune points to "GM's mammoth bureau-
cracy - layer upon layer of managers, departments, and committees -
[which has] to approve, re-approve, and cross-approve the car divisions'
every move" as playing an important role in the firm's continuously dete-
riorating market and financial performance. 1" Excessive vertical size
and integration in parts and components production exacerbate these dis-
economies of undue size, further inflating costs and undermining effi-
ciency. 112 Most generally, informed experts conclude that the "basic
question nagging this biggest, most diverse, and most integrated of car
companies is whether it is just too big to compete in today's fast-chang-
ing car market.""' 3
As an increasing number of analysts now recognize, no amount of
inter-corporate alliances seems capable of curing this endemic malady.
In its recent analysis of GM's ongoing woes, for example, the conserva-
tive Economist prescribes that to "save his firm, Mr. Stempel must break
it up. He should sell off EDS and Hughes Aerospace, the costly high-
tech distractions which have contributed little to cars. He should dis-
member GM's car division into two or three independent companies,
freeing them to compete with one another and to handle their own
designs.'114
Second, by agreeing to import cars and components produced
abroad by their foreign partners, are not the Big Three surrendering one
segment of the market after another, effectively turning each over to the
foreign producers, and consequently abandoning ever-larger shares of the
overall market? If so, in what conceivable way can this promote United
States competitiveness? As Forbes warns: "One clear danger is that
American automakers will let themselves become overly dependent on
109 See generally Adams and Brock, supra note 78, at 38-41, 60-62.
110 Detroit Under Siege, ECONoMsT, Apr. 14, 1990, at 13.
111 Fisher, GM Is Tougher Than You Think, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 1986, at 56, 57.
112 See Risen, Tight Network of Suppliers Provides Key Support for Japan's Auto Makers, L.A.
Times, Jan. 17, 1990, at D1.
113 Hampton & Norman, General Motor" What Went Wrong, Bus. WK., Mar. 16, 1987, at 102,
110.
114 Supra note 110, at 13.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:433(1991)
their foreign partners and abandon certain fields of technological know-
how. GM doesn't build its own small car in the U.S., Chrysler hasn't
done any serious reworking of its small cars for over a decade, and
Ford's next small car will be a Mazda derivative."' 15
Third, are joint ventures between the Big Three and their largest
foreign rivals the only path by which they can learn how to manufacture
cars efficiently? Is the joint venture between General Motors and Toyota
- the world's largest and third largest automotive firms - the only way
for GM to learn efficient production methods? Must the Big Three si-
multaneously ally themselves with the Big Four in Japan, with the Big
Five in Europe, and with the largest emerging Korean producers? Or are
there not more competitive alternatives available, such as "toe-hold"
joint ventures with smaller producers? More generally, did the govern-
ment's approval of the GM-Toyota joint production venture in 1983 not
serve to encourage a proliferation of similar global partnership pacts,
binding together the remaining major firms in the world industry?
Finally, in joining with their foreign rivals on such a prodigious
scale, are not these automotive firms subverting foreign competition -
the only real source of competition in the industry in forty years - by
converting formerly independent rivals into partners bound to one an-
other at almost every turn? Necessitating a sharing of information and
plans, these alliances inevitably undermine the product and pricing un-
certainty that fosters effective competition. By involving a plethora of
product exchanges between partners, they amount to a gradual global
allocation of the market among ostensible competitors. At a minimum,
these transnational alliances resoundingly refute the proposition that
"global competition" is an automatic corrective for anticompetitive ten-
dencies generated by interfirm partnerships.
These concerns are not farfetched. Students of the industry recall
that beginning in the 1950s, as automotive smog pollution worsened and
national concern about the problem heightened, the Big Three entered
into a joint "research" venture designed not to promote competition in
commercializing pollution technology, but to suppress it. In an antitrust
suit filed in 1969 (which the industry did not contest), the Justice Depart-
ment found that behind the guise of a "joint venture," the auto giants
"conspired not to compete in research, development, manufacture, and
installation of [pollution] control devices, and collectively did all in their
power to delay such research, development, manufacturing, and installa-
tion."1 1 6 Specifically, it found that they ignored promising inventions,
115 Flint, Make Love, Not War, FORBES, Oct. 2, 1989, at 46.
116 Smog Control Antitrust Case, 117 CONG. REc. 15,626 (1971).
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refused to purchase pollution controls developed by others, delayed in-
stalling smog controls, and at times disciplined their joint venture part-
ners whose loyalty to the team flagged. 17 "Since the industry was
fortified from the beginning of the program with the agreement among its
members not to take competitive advantage over each other," the Justice
Department concluded, "all auto manufacturers were able through the
years to stall, delay, impede and retard research, development, produc-
tion and installation of motor vehicle pollution control equipment."1 18
This is hardly a stirring testimonial to the prowess of "joint ventures" in
advancing the nation's technological frontiers. 9
In both its scope and scale, a decade of joint ventures in the automo-
tive industry has secured an interlocking system of mutually acceptable
accords, and may well have forged the groundwork for cartelizing the
world automobile industry. 120
117 Id at 15,627-37.
118 Id. at 15,633.
119 In 1973, the prestigious National Academy of Sciences reprimanded the joint "research" ven-
ture's effects in the following terms: "It is unfortunate that the automobile industry did not seriously
undertake such a [pollution control] program on its own volition until it was subjected to govern-
mental pressure. A relatively modest investment, over the past decade, in developmental programs
related to emission control could have precluded the crisis that now prevails in the industry and the
nation." NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REPORT BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON MOTOR
VEHICLE EMISSIONS, reprinted in 119 CONG. Rc. 5,831, at 5,849 (1973).
120 It is significant to add that developments in the United States steel industry, and their an-
ticompetitive implications, mirror those just examined in the automobile industry.
Over the two decades following World War II, the United States steel industry's oligopolistic
structure and conduct generated increasingly noncompetitive performance results - including
steady, substantial price-wage-cost escalation, and technological obsolescence. As a result of this
noncompetitive performance, the industry became increasingly vulnerable to foreign competition,
with the share of imports in the American market rising nearly six-fold, from less than 3% in 1959,
to 17% by 1968. Adams, The Steel Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 85 (W.
Adams ed.) (4th ed. 1971).
Confronted with the specter of competition, the oligopoly and the Steelworkers joined to lobby
government for protection, and succeeded in obtaining a succession of increasingly restrictive gov-
ernment restraints, quotas, "voluntary marketing agreements," market allocation agreements, and
minimum "trigger" prices - all ostensibly designed to provide the industry with the "breathing
space" needed in order to enable it to regain the competitiveness it had forfeited over the preceding
decades. See generally W. ADAMS AND J. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX 263-70 (1987); Adams &
Brock, Tacit Vertical Collusion and the Labor-Industrial Complex, 62 NEB. L. REv. 621, 679-94
(1983); and Adams, Import Restraints and Industrial Performance: The Dilemma of Protectionism, 1
MICH. Y.B. OF INT'L LEGAL STUD. 34-52 (1979).
As in autos, however, Big Steel in the 1980s utilized its "breathing space" of government pro-
tection to join with, rather than fight, its major foreign rivals - particularly those from Japan. As
the following table shows, by the late-1980s, this increasingly expansive web of alliances and cross-
ownership agreements had come to link National Steel with Japan's Nippon Kokan steel firm; In-
land Steel with Nippon Steel; LTV with Sumitomo Metals; Wheeling-Pittsburgh and Japan's Nisshin
Steel; Armco with Japan's Itoh and Kawasaki steel firms; and United States Steel Corporation (now
USX) with Japan's Kobe Steel.
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IV. THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
In the wake of airline deregulation at home, and European efforts to
promote greater competition abroad, air transportation has joined the
race to joint ventures. In the late 1980s, inter-carrier alliances have be-
come the industry's modus operandi.
A. United States Deregulation and Consolidation
Confronted with an accumulating body of persuasive evidence, Con-
gress and the Carter administration opted in 1978 to abandon forty years
of government control of domestic airlines. While the government re-
tained responsibility for air safety, public policy would rely on the com-
petitive market to determine how many carriers would fly what routes, at
what fares, and at what level of service.12'
The initial results were promising: scores of new carriers entered
the field; the number of carriers tripled; existing carriers - particularly
regional carriers - expanded beyond their hitherto restricted territories
and routes; airfares dropped, sparking significantly higher rates of
U.S.-Japanese
Joint Ventures in Steel
Operations
U.S. Firm Japanese Partner Involved
Inland Nippon Steel Cold-rolling
Galvanizing
National NKK Integrated
CVRD Kawasaki Steel Rolling
Armco Kawasaki Steel Integrated
LTV Sumitomo Electro-
galvanizing
Wheeling-Pitt Nisshin Steel Coating Line
Integrated
Nucor Yamato Kogyo Structurals
USX Kobe Steel Structurals
Source: U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Pub. No. 2298, Monthly Report on the Status of the Steel
Industry vi-v (July 1990); Wartzman USX Sets U.S. Steel Venture With Kobe, Wall St. J., Feb. 15,
1989, at B8, col. 1.
In steel, as in autos, the burgeoning scope and scale of corporate alliances raises the question
whether in their actual operation they will serve to promote, or to contain, competition among the
partner-rivals. At a minimum, the magnitude of the joint venture movement in steel (as in autos)
casts considerable doubt on the efficacy of "global competition" among firms intricately conjoined
with one another in an interlocking series of transnational partnership pacts. More generally, for
students of the industry, it is eerily reminiscent of the global steel cartels forged during the 1920s and
1930s. See E. HEXNER, THE INTERNATIONAL STEEL CARTEL (1943); Stocking & Watkins, supra
note 54, at 171-215; and FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL STEEL CARTELS
(1948).
121 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. app. sec. 1301 (Supp. 1987)). For a detailed examination of events and the evidence
culminating in the deregulation of airlines, see W. ADAMS AND J. BROCK, supra note 78, at 219-228.
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growth in air travel; productivity rose; and consumer choices
multiplied. 122
Soon thereafter, however, the Reagan administration abdicated its
antitrust responsibilities, triggering a voracious merger and acquisition
movement in the industry. Over the brief 1985-1987 period, the adminis-
tration sanctioned some 26 airline combinations, involving upwards of
70% of the industry's total capacity. 12 1 Prominent among these were
Northwest's acquisition of Republic; US Air's acquisition of Piedmont
and Pacific Southwestern Airlines; TWA's acquisition of Ozark; Delta's
acquisition of Western Airlines; American Airlines' acquisition of Air-
Cal; and Texas Air's acquisition of Continental, Eastern, and People Ex-
press (after People Express had acquired Frontier Airlines).1 24
Approximately 50 airline mergers and acquisitions occurred be-
tween 1979 and 1988, producing dramatic increases in industry concen-
tration.1 25  By 1988, fifteen independent airlines operating at the
beginning of 1986 had been consolidated into six large carriers.1 26 In
1978, the five largest carriers accounted for 69% of the industry; by
1985, their collective market share had fallen to 57% in the initial after-
math of deregulation; by 1988, however, their share had risen to 74%. 127
By 1989, the share of the eight largest carriers reached 92%.128
Monopoly "fortress" hubs were erected in major cities across the
country.1 29 At 22 of the nation's major airports, a single carrier now
122 Id. at 229. See also Moore, U.S. Airline Deregulation: Its Effects on Passengers, Capital and
Labor, 29 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1986), analyzing the industry's performance over the period 1976-
1983.
123 W. ADAMS AND J. BROCK, DANGEROUS PURSUITS: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE
AGE OF WALL STREET 104 (1989).
124 Id. 102-104.
125 P.S. DEMPSEY, FLYING BLIND: THE FAILURE OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION 12 (Economic
Policy Institute, Mar. 1989).
126 Id. at 12-13.
127 Airline Concentration at Hub Airports, 1988: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1989).
128 Dempsey, supra note 125, at 13.
129 That monopoly has subverted competition is obvious to the financial community in its assess-
ments of airlines:
USAir controls 33 of the 42 gates at Pittsburgh and thus has insulated itself from large-scale
competition.... The many Pittsburgh monopolies have allowed USAir to react to low-fare
competition elsewhere on the system by increasing fares in Pittsburgh.... We estimate that
more than 50 percent of these USAir customers are traveling on monopoly routes. This exclu-
sive right to provide air transportation to 2.25 million passengers per year should be included in
any evaluation of the assets of USAir. The merger of Northwest and Republic airlines has
created a similar monopoly in Minneapolis.... Similar concentrations exist for TWA at St.
Louis....
OPPENHEIMER & CO., MONTHLY PORTFOLIO STRATEGY, Feb. 18, 1987, quoted in Airline Deregula-
tion and the Effect it has had on Airline Transportation in the United States, 1987. Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
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controls over half of the air traffic; at 9 of them, one carrier controls
more than 75%. 130 Examples include Cincinnati, where the largest car-
rier controls an estimated 68% of air travel; St. Louis, 82%; Minneapo-
lis, 82%; Pittsburgh, 83%; Salt Lake City, 75%; and Detroit, 65%."'
Predictably, this merger-induced concentration has eroded competi-
tion in the industry. A pronounced, noncompetitive pattern of price
leadership, price following and price matching has evolved, boosting air
fares substantially, particularly at hubs dominated by single carriers.
132
Combined with declining service quality, the industry's post-consolida-
tion performance has created a situation that Senator John Danforth (R.-
Mo.) describes as "intolerable" - so much so that a growing chorus is
now demanding a re-regulation of the field.
1 3 1
100th Cong., Ist Sess. 88-89 (1987) (statement of Alfred E. Kahn, Prof. of Political Economy, Cor-
nell University).
The "beauty" of the monopoly hub strategy, as confidentially articulated by an executive vice
president of one airline, is that "it enables us to keep control of prices within our niche territory, thus
insulating a significant portion of our traffic from the devastating effects of unbridled price competi-
tion." Quoted in Borenstein, Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the U.S.
Airline Industry, Discussion Paper, INST. OF PUB. POL'Y STUD., U. OF MICH. at 1 (May 1989).
130 DANGEROUS PURSUITS, supra note 123, at 104.
131 DANGEROUS PURSUITS, supra note 123, at 105. For a detailed analysis of the structural im-
pediments posed to effective competition, see Barriers to Competition in the Airline Industry, General
Accounting Office, before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Trans-
portation (Sept. 21, 1989) (statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Director, Transportation Issues).
132 The General Accounting Office has found air fares at concentrated airports to be 27% higher
than at other, comparable airports. Effects of Airline Concentration at Hub Airports on Fares and
Services, 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1989) (statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Director,
Transportation Issues, USGAO).
Other studies report fares at concentrated hub airports to have been inflated by 50% or more.
See Airline Economics Inc., Blue Chip Airline Financial Indicators, 1988.
For example, asked why his airline avoids lowering its prices, American Airlines Chairman
Robert Crandall candidly replied: "Because it would be dumb.... The reality is that you will go to
Detroit because you have to go to Detroit whether the fare is $175, $275 or $375." Quoted in
Winans & Dahl, Airlines Skid on Bad Moves, Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1989, at B4.
The oligopoly mentality - whereby firms in concentrated markets strive to avoid price compe-
tition with one another - has been articulated by a US Air official. Asked why an airline would
refrain from lowering its fares in order to win business from its rivals, he points out: "If I know that
if I cut my fare $20 today, you're going to cut yours $20 tomorrow, then its stupid for me to do it."
Quoted in Eichel, Flying the Unfriendly Skies, special publication, Philadelphia Inquirer, 1989, at 4.
For additional evidence of noncompetitive oligopoly pricing, see Nomani, Dispatches From the Air-
Fare Front, Wall St. J., July 11, 1989, at BI; and Nomani, Airlines May Be Using A Price-Data
Network to Lessen Competition, Wall St. J., June 28, 1990, at 1.
See generally, Shepherd, The Airline Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY
230-40 (W. Adams ed.) (8th ed. 1989).
133 McGinley, Republicans Are Joining Chorus of Airline Critics Seeking Partial Reregulation to
Spur Competition, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1989, at A24. For a case study of the anticompetitive impact
of one airline merger, see Airline Competition: Fare and Service Changes at St. Louis Since the
TWA-Ozark Merger (USGAO Sept. 1988).
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B. Liberalization Efforts Abroad
Coinciding with these developments in the American market, there
were recurring efforts to encourage greater airline competition abroad.
The Common Market's "1992" program and its objective of fostering
greater competition across and within West European nations is a case in
point.
Traditionally, the European airline industry was pervasively
cartelized, with fares dictated, and traffic shares rigidly allocated among
carriers on the basis of bilateral pacts negotiated between national gov-
ernments. 13 4 Dissatisfaction with high fares, however, and the goal of
obtaining a truly common market, have combined to stimulate a public
policy movement toward liberalization of European air transportation.
In the 1980s, the European Civil Aviation Conference, comprising
the directors general of twenty-two European nations, has asserted its
commitment to greater liberalization of air transportation. Over the
years 1984-1987, it promulgated a number of memoranda of understand-
ing - both between European nations as well as among non-European
nations (including the United States) - intended to promote greater fare
flexibility and increased opportunities for new entry. 3 5
The EEC Commission, a non-partisan body appointed by agreement
of the member states of the Common Market, has issued two major
memoranda (in 1979 and again in 1984) strongly encouraging member
nations to implement steps to promote increased competition in the in-
dustry, and to facilitate greater flexibility in air fares, route access, and
transport capacities.136 In addition, the Commission in 1986 threatened
to prosecute major carriers should they continue to engage in price fixing
and territorial market divisions.
1 37
In December 1987, the European Community transport ministers
unveiled a revamped airline liberalization package, proposing to ease re-
134 See generally A. SAMPSON, EMPIRES OF THE SKY: THE PoLmIcS, CONTESTS AND CARTELS
OF WORLD AIRLINES (1984); Dempsey, Aerial Dogfights Over Europe: The Liberalization of EEC
Air Transport, 53 J. AIR TRANSP. & COMM. 615 (1988).
To illustrate, industry expert Jacques Pelkmans reports that in many European countries "there
is only one 'flag carrer', having been granted monopoly on many routes... If they exist at all, fringe
competitors are extremely restrained; occasionally, it is not exaggerated to hold that they are at the
mercy of the 'flag carrier', both in the market and via the power it can yield through the regulators."
In a study undertaken in the early 1980s, only 2 percent of the European city-pairs examined con-
tained more than a single designated air carrier. Pelkmans, Deregulation of European Air Transport,
in 2 MAINSTREAMS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 347, 354-55, 377 (H.W. de Jong and W.G.
Shepherd eds.) (1986).
135 Dempsey, supra note 134, at 626-27.
136 Id. at 656-63.
137 Id. at 668.
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strictions against discount fares, and permitting individual carriers to
compete for up to 60-75% of cross-border traffic (as opposed to the typi-
cal 50-50 split between national flag carriers serving each other's mar-
kets). 1 38 And, in 1989, the EC transport ministers agreed that traffic
sharing agreements should be scrapped by 1993, and a "double disap-
proval" system for fares should be instituted, which would allow carriers
the freedom unilaterally to lower their fares unless all affected nations
disapprove. 139
.Accompanying these liberalization efforts on the Community level,
some individual nations on their own initiative renegotiated their bilat-
eral airline pacts in order to enhance the scope for competition among
carriers. The British and Dutch governments have led this dimension of
the fight for increased competition140 - with the result that new routes
and traffic were opened up for new carriers, and that fare reductions of as
much as 60% in some cases were initiated.
14 1
The European Community's intent was clear. It was, according to
Peter Sutherland, the Community's erstwhile Minister of Competition, to
"go on one route toward greater competition, recognizing that greater
efficiency results from competition." 42
138 Greenhouse, Europeans Deregulate Air Travel, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1987, at 33.
139 See Greenhouse, One Europe, but Many Airlines, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1989, at 23, and
Maremont, Where the Skies Aren't Getting Any Friendlier, Bus. WK., Apr. 16, 1990, at 38. A
number of these memoranda are reprinted as appendices in Dempsey, supra note 134.
140 Dempsey, supra note 134, at 629-37. Since June 1984, for example:
the United Kingdom has concluded agreements with the Benelux countries which:
(a) contain no limitations on capacity or frequency of services among these countries;
(b) give either government the right to permit additional airlines to operate on any route;
(c) enable airlines to set whatever fares they choose, unless both governments disapprove.
Arrangements that are less liberal, but nevertheless represent some advance, have also been
made between the United Kingdom and West Germany and the United Kingdom and
Switzerland.
R. PRYKE, COMPETITION AMONG INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES at 105 (1987).
141 See Heard, European Air Fares Start Falling Out of the Sky, Bus. WK., May 19, 1986, at 63;
One Europe, Many Airlines, supra note 139, at 28. However commendable these steps to liberaliza-
tion may be, the "only development that would make the position of the existing carriers less secure
is the provision that charter operators can enter the scheduled market." PRYKE, supra note 140, at
103-04.
142 Quoted in Europeans Deregulate Air Travel, supra note 138, at 33. The EEC Commission
declared in 1984:
[R]ecent years have made it clear that although the present regime has produced an extensive
network of aviation services, the rigidities of the system... give rise to an increasing degree of
public dissatisfaction. This criticism (not all of which is justified) has tended to centre on the
civil aviation services provided within Europe; and the Commission is confirmed in its view that
within the Community there is scope for introducing more flexibility and competition into the
existing system without destroying it or losing the benefits that it has brought about.
Commission of the European Communities, Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2, Progress Towards
the Development of Community Air Transport Policy 32-33 (1984), quoted in Dempsey, supra note
134, at 660.
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C. The Joint Venture Movement
It is in this context that alliances between airlines have recently pro-
liferated, developing in two main directions.
First, in the United States, the major carriers have not only merged
with and acquired one another; at the same time, through a spate of "af-
filiate" agreements, alliances and cross-ownership shares, the majors
have acquired effective control over smaller regional carriers - a tradi-
tional starting point for new competitors in the industry. In 1984, for
example, only twelve regional airlines were involved in "partnership"
agreements with major carriers. By 1988, however, the number of re-
gional partnership alliances had grown to include 48 of the country's 50
largest regional carriers. 143 As a result, according to one expert, the
"mission of the regionals [has] changed from serving community needs
to serving the needs of the major carriers. '"" Regional lines favored by
agreements with the majors prospered at the expense of other, unaffili-
ated regional carriers, and these alliances, in turn, raised barriers to ex-
pansion and new entry. Concentration in the regional segment of the
industry began to resemble the concentration among the trunklines. 145
Second, on the global level, most of the world's largest carriers have
forged a series of interlocking alliances. These joint ventures, primarily
comprised of major U.S. and European carriers, variously encompass
partnerships in scheduling and marketing; sharing of gates, routes and
reservation systems; and exchanges of cross-ownership ties (see Table 9
and Figure 2).
In 1987, for example, United Airlines, the 4th largest carrier in the
United States, entered into an alliance with newly-privatized British Air,
the largest European carrier, providing for terminal sharing, reservation
cooperation, and schedule coordination.146 At the time of its announce-
ment, Lord King, British Airways' chairman, described the alliance as
enabling "two of the world's best airlines to develop alongside each other
as the most formidable international partnership in every part of the
globe."14 7 In addition, British Air has offered to buy up to 15% of
143 Rose, Major U.S. Airlines Rapidly Gain Control Over Regional Lines, Wall St. J., Feb. 17,
1988, at 1, 11.
144 Id. at 11.
145 Id. See also Salpukas, Deregulation Left Only the Strong, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1990, see. 3,
at 10.
146 Maremont, British Airways is Out to Create Its Own United Kingdom, Bus. WK., Dec. 28,
1987, at 90.
147 Quoted in Prokesch, Revamped, British Air Looks Abroad, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1989, at 31,
col. 4.
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TABLE 9




Carrier (millions) Carrier (millions)
Texas Air' 73.3 British Airways 22.5
American 64.3 Lufthansa 17.8
Delta 60.0 Air France 14.8
USAirb 59.6 Iberia 14.5
United 56.3 SAS 13.3
Northwest 35.8 Alitalia 9.2
TWA 25.1 Swissair 7.1
Southwest 16.8 Olympic 6.7
Pan American 16.8 KLM 6.2
America West 12.7 JAT 3.9
' includes wholly-owned Eastern and Continental subsidiaries.
b includes wholly-owned Piedmont subsidiary.
Source: Air Transport Association, Air Transport 1989, and Greenhouse, One Europe, But
Many Airlines, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1989, at 23.
United in the course of the latter's ongoing buyout battle, 4 ' while
United, in turn, has struck a partnership agreement with Alitalia (West-
ern Europe's 6th largest carrier) encompassing shared facilities, and co-
ordinated pricing and scheduling agreements similar to those contained
in its British Air pact.49
KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, Western Europe's 9th largest carrier,
has purchased a $400 million ownership stake in Northwest Airlines, the
6th largest American carrier.150 KLM also has disclosed plans to join
with British Air in acquiring a 20% stake in the Belgian flag carrier,
Sabena.151
Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), 5th largest in Western Europe,
has acquired a 9.8% ownership stake in Frank Lorenzo's Texas Air-
Eastern-Continental empire - whose combined operations ranked it the
largest U.S. carrier in 1988 - and the firms have undertaken to coordi-
nate their operations worldwide.152 In addition, SAS and Swissair (7th
largest in Western Europe) have proposed to exchange 10% ownership
148 See Greenhouse, supra note 139, sec. D, at 10, col. 4.
149 United, Alitalia Broaden Partnership for Marketing, Wall St. J., June 2, 1988, at 28.
150 Power & Payne, Birds of a Feather... Are Doing Deals Together, Bus. WK., Sept. 11, 1989, at
32.
151 Id.
152 Id.; see also Salpukas, In Newark, Airport to Go International, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1988, sec.
B, at 1, col. 2.
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stakes in one another. 151 SAS and Swissair have also joined together
with Finland's Finnair in a joint operating agreement involving cross-
ownership exchanges.' 54
Swissair, in turn, has agreed to exchange ownership shares of 5%
with Delta Air Lines, the 3rd largest carrier in the United States, and the
two firms have entered into a joint marketing agreement.' 5 5 In addition,
Delta and Swissair have forged an equity swap with Singapore
Airlines. 15
6
Similarly, Lufthansa and Air France - Western Europe's 2nd and
3rd largest carriers - have struck an alliance providing for joint market-
ing, coordination of routes and schedules, and a sharing of gates and
terminals, as have Air France and U.S. Air.'57
These global partnerships are becoming more comprehensive in na-
ture and organization. For example, American Airlines, Japan Air Lines
and Australia's Quantas have joined together to purchase a 35% stake in
New Zealand's recently privatized carrier, Air New Zealand. 5 In the
case of Austrian Airlines, Swissair owns 8% of the carrier, All Nippon
Air owns 3.5%, Air France owns 1.5%, and Lufthansa is contemplating
purchasing a 10% share of the line.' 59
In addition to these alliances, and overlapping with them, has been
the emergence of computer reservation consortiums between leading Eu-
ropean carriers which, in turn, are teaming up with the largest American
computer systems. In Europe, as in the United States, a few computer
systems have come to dominate air reservations - Galileo (a joint con-
sortium involving British Air, KLM, Swissair and Alitalia, among
others), and Amadeus (a joint venture involving Lufthansa, Air France,
and SAS). 16 0 The Galileo system, in turn, has allied itself with United
Airlines' Apollo system, the 2nd largest air reservation system in the
United States,161 while Amadeui has since allied itself with Texas Air's
153 James, How Will the Future Airline Globe Be Divided, Fifteenth Annual FAA Aviation
Forecast Conference, 1989, at 3.
154 Three European Airlines in Deal, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1989, see. D, at 10, col. 6.
155 Power & Payne, supra note 150, at 32.
156 James, supra note 153, at 4-5.
157 Greenhouse, supra note 139, see. D, at 10, col. 4; US. Air, Air France Plan Links Between
Businesses, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1990, at C12.
158 Power & Payne, supra, note 150, at 32.
159 James, supra note 153 at 7.
160 Lohr, Sparring to Book Europe's Flights, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1988, sec. D, at 4, col. 4.
161 Id.; See also Carey, Race For Computerized Booking Systems is Heating Up Among European
Airlines, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at A18, col. 2.
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Continental-Eastern reservation system and American's Sabre System.1"2
At the same time, on the Asian front, one Asian computer reservation
system (Abacus) has tied into the Northwest/TWA/Delta software sys-
tem, while American Airlines has linked with Quantas to market Ameri-
can's Sabre computer reservation system in the Australian region of the
Pacific. 16 3 In the light of their pronounced susceptibility to anticompeti-
tive manipulation, these joint ventures in computer reservation systems
are particularly troublesome.164
D. Public Policy Issues
In their scope, their scale, and the rapidity of their growth, these
joint ventures and inter-firm alliances appear to pose clear anticompeti-
tive threats in at least three significant ways.
First, with regard to the United States, and in the wake of the indus-
try's progressive consolidation, the joint ventures seem designed to effec-
tively co-opt the only two remaining sources of potential competition:
the regional American carriers, which might otherwise develop into
larger lines and compete with the majors; and European carriers, which
would otherwise constitute prime candidates for potential entry into the
U.S. market. This is somewhat ironic: At a time when U.S. and Euro-
pean carriers are fashioning joint ventures and alliances at a furious pace,
some commentators still insist that foreign carriers are the competitive
antidote to the oligopoly and monopoly ills afflicting the American
market. 165
Second, alliances between Europe's largest carriers clearly jeopard-
ize EC efforts to liberalize air transportation and to promote competition.
As Business Week observes: "Even before the European Community un-
leashes deregulation, airlines across Europe are hustling to defend long-
protected routes. While cementing cozy alliances among themselves, the
162 Solomon, U.S.-Based Airlines Heighten the Battle For Europe's Skies, Wall St. J., Apr. 18,
1989, at A4; New Linkup for Travel, New York Times, Nov. 17, 1990, at 8.
163 Feldman, The New Alliances, FREQUENT FLYER, June 1990, at 74.
164 For the anticompetitive impact of computer reservation systems, see Airline Computer Reser-
vation Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 42-67 (1988) (statement of Victor S. Rezendes, USGAO); see
also Nomani, Airlines May Be Using A Price-Data Network to Lessen Competition, Wall St. J., June
28, 1990, at 1, col. 6.
165 See Koten, Foreign and U.S. Airlines Clash Over Access to Domestic Routes, Wall St. J., Dec.
7, 1987, at 23, col. 3; and Cushman, Air Market Rule Change, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1989, sec. D, at 4,
col. 3. Placed in the context of this proliferation ofjoint ventures, transportation Secretary Skinner's
recently announced policy permitting foreign airlines to acquire larger ownership positions in U.S.
carriers also seems incompatible with the goals of fostering a more competitive international aviation
marketplace (remarks prepared for delivery by Secretary of transportation Samuel K. Skinner, Na-
tional Press Club, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1991 (mimeo)).
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entrenched carriers are swallowing small airlines that could pose a
threat." In this, the magazine points out, "they've learned from the fre-
netic U.S. shakeout that bigger is better and that it pays to dominate key
airport hubs." As a result, "the hopes for widespread competition, so
bright only a few months ago, are dimming under the crushing weight of
alliances, takeovers, and squeeze plays...,"166 These trends are exacer-
bated by an emerging merger and consolidation movement in Europe, as
European majors - like their American counterparts - acquire smaller,
recently established carriers,"' as well as some of their very largest po-
tential competitors at home (i.e., British Air's 1987 acquisition of British
Caledonia Airways, raising BA's share of British international flights to
95%,18 and Air France's 1990 announcement of its plans to take over
the two largest domestic French carriers, UTA and Air Inter). 69
Third, considered in their entirety, this burgeoning network of inter-
carrier cooperation pacts may be effectively consolidating the airline in-
dustry on a global basis, and concentrating it in the hands of a world
oligopoly. "These agreements, which are turning rivals into allies, will
have a profound effect on competition," Michael Dershin points out.
"At present, the beginning of the four global partners [is] taking shape:
United/[British Airways]; Delta/Swissair; Texas Air/SAS; and North-
west/KLM." 170  Other Community officials discern an even tighter
nexus emerging; they suggest that the eventual advent of a duopoly of
carriers, jointly linked around the two major computer reservation sys-
tems, may not be farfetched in the light of current trends.1 71
In sum, joint ventures - joint operating agreements, jointly con-
trolled gates and routes, cross-ownership ties, jointly controlled com-
puter reservation systems - may well be beginning to replicate, and to
extend on a global scale, the anticompetitive structure, conduct and per-
formance experienced in United States air transportation.
166 Maremont, supra note 139, at 38-39.
167 Feldman, Holding the Fort, FREQUENT FLYER, June 1989, at 28-32.
168 Marcum, U.K. to Review British Air Plan ForA Takeover, Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1987, at 16, col.
1; and Hemp & Carey, British Airways Wins Approval to Buy Carrier, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1987, at
34.
169 Toy, Maremont & Kapstein, Will the EC Let Air France Spread Its Wings? Bus. WK., Jan.
29, 1990, at 48.
170 Quoted in James, supra note 153, at 6.
171 See UK Regulator Foresees Active Role By EC to Ensure Airlines Competition, 58 ANTrrRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. 855 (May 31, 1990).
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V. LOOKING BACKWARD: GLOBAL JOINT VENTURES AND THE
INTERWAR CARTEL MOVEMENT
The preceding case studies illustrate the anticompetitive problems
posed by joint ventures. But it is important to recognize that these exam-
ples are neither isolated, nor are they new. Infatuation with cooperation
and corporate "strategic alliances" played a key role in the epic, transna-
tional cartel movement that spanned the first four decades of the century,
and that peaked during the years between the two world wars.
Then, as now, the nation's economic performance was cause for
concern. Then, as now, American industry charged that "ruinous for-
eign competition" was destroying it. 72 Then, as in recent years, anti-
trust laws "gathered dust on the statute books." '173
In that earlier age, as today, business leaders convinced themselves
that "cooperation" marked the path to better economic performance.
Britain's Lord McGowan, influential Conservative Party member, co-or-
ganizer of the British Imperial Chemical Industries combine and leading
spokesman for British industry, declared: "Large businesses have in the
past been built on the foundations of unrestricted competition, but this is
no longer a method which generally commends itself. It belongs to an
age when men could imagine no other way to progress than at the ex-
pense of others.... There are few today who would recommend a return
to unrestricted competition as the basis for our economy. . ." The only
viable option, he insisted, was business "cooperation and agreement." 174
As articulated by Sir Alfred Mond, another leading British industri-
alist, "The old idea of the heads of great business meeting each other
with scowls and shaking each other's fists in each other's faces ... may
be very good on the films, but it does not accord with any given facts."
Instead, as he saw it, an "alliance of great companies operating on huge
scales with every kind of interest and working in harmonious co-opera-
tion renders it possible to have exchange of information as regards meth-
ods of business and new ideas, and we all do better by working in that
manner...,175
These views led business leaders to conclude that cartelization af-
forded the best ground rules for conducting the world's industry. 76 An
172 Kreps, Experience with Unilateral Action Toward International Cartels, in A CARTEL POLICY
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 70, at 87 (1945).
173 Id. at 78.
174 Combines and CartelsThe Sunday Times (London), July 25, 1943, at 4, quoted in G. STOCK-
ING & M. WATKINS, CARTELS OR COMPETITION 357 (1948).
175 Quoted in G. STOCKING & M. WATKINS, supra note 54, at 429.
176 Cartels, Lord McGowan believed, "can lead to a more ordered organization of production...
They can help to stabilize prices at a reasonable level... They can lead to a rapid improvement in
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eruption of cartels was the result, encompassing many of the world's ma-
jor industries, and involving producers in virtually all industrialized na-
tions. In steel, for example, a
general agreement regulated the export of all crude or semifinished steel,
and six special agreements regulated the export of certain classes of steel
products. The general agreement provided over-all quotas for each national
group. The special agreements fixed specific quotas for particular classes of
steel products - bars, rods, structural shapes, and the like - which might
or might not correspond to the over-all quotas of the several national
groups. 1
77
As the steel cartel became fully operational, it expanded its scope and
tightened its controls. In addition to the initial organizing producers in
Germany, Belgium, France, and Luxembourg, it eventually came to in-
clude the major steel-producing groups of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Aus-
tria, and the United Kingdom and the United States. By 1937, it
encompassed an estimated 90% of all iron and steel traded in interna-
tional markets. 17
8
Other cartelized fields included aluminum, petroleum, magnesium,
electric lamps, ball bearings, and virtually every aspect of the sprawling
chemicals industry. 179 Stocking and Watkins estimated that, by 1939,
international cartels had come to control approximately 42% of manu-
factured products, 60% of agricultural products, and 87% of the mineral
products sold in the United States. 180 Professor James Rahl estimates
that international cartels controlled 30 to 50% of all world trade in the
years preceding the outbreak of World War II.181 At the outbreak of the
war, a Justice Department investigation found 179 global cartels in oper-
ation, with American firms participating in 109 of them.'82
technique and a reduction in costs... They can spread the benefits of inventions from one country to
another by exchanging research results, by the cross-licensing of patents, and by the provision of
important 'know-how'..." Quoted in STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 174, at 356 (italics in
original).
For empirical refutations of these claims, see infra note 188, and the sources cited therein.
It should be noted that in reaching these conclusions, industrialists could look to the academic
community for support. In 1927, D.H. McGregor, a leading Cambridge economist in the field of
industrial organization, announced that "the idea of regulating output by concerted arrangements
between producers is no longer seriously opposed by economic theory.. ." Quoted in CARTELS OR
COMPETITION, supra note 174, at 60.
177 STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 54, at 186.
178 Id. at 187.
179 See generally id.; C. WILCOX, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 219
(TNEC Monograph No. 21, 1940.)
180 STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 54, at 4-5.
181 Rahl, International Application of American Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 336, 353 (1980).
182 Id.
Joint Ventures, Antitrust, and Transnational Cartelization
11:433(1991)
Clearly, the degree of "cooperation" which had been achieved was
impressive. But cooperative aspirations eventually exceeded even these
considerable accomplishments, as business leaders sought to subsume
their intra-industry alliances within ever grander systems of inter-indus-
try and internationional cartel controls. Among the latter was the infa-
mous Diisseldorf Agreement of 1939. As summarized by Stocking and
Watkins:
The object of the Disseldorf conference of March 15-16, 1939 was a general
agreement between German and British industry to replace competition by
cooperative exploitation of world markets. The idea was not simply to fos-
ter cartels in industries in which they had not yet developed but to coordi-
nate the terms of various existing agreements, to extend the program to
other countries, and in general to consolidate the whole movement. It was,
in brief, a plan to complete the cartelization of the world economy.1 83
Transnational "joint ventures" were among the tools employed in
constructing and sustaining these cartels. For example, in 1928, in a let-
ter to his German counterpart at the Farben chemical firm, Irenee du
Pont outlined the importance of joint ventures in maintaining cartel con-
trol: "Our suggestion," he wrote, "in the ammonia field and the high
pressure synthetic field in general, or in dyestuffs or pharmaceuticals, or
in any field of manufacture where it appears that the situation makes it
desirable to enter each others' market, is that we get together .... It ap-
pears to us that the most logical form in any of these cases would be to
form a domestic company, to be jointly owned...""'
Global firms, versed in the art of peaceful coexistence, came to un-
derstand, first, that suppressing competition in one sphere of their opera-
tions would facilitate control in other areas and, second, that in achieving
this result joint ventures could play an important institutional role. They
recognized, as one DuPont official explained the appeal of technology-
sharing joint ventures, that "satisfactory relations on the commercial side
would follow automatically, as [it is] unlikely that the companies would
compete with one another commercially in a senseless fashion, while co-
operating technically." '85
The petroleum industry, as already noted, offers one illustration of
the role that joint ventures came to play in creating and cementing global
market control. The world chemical cartel, as it was found to operate in
1946, affords another:
183 STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 174, at 60-61.
184 Quoted in C. EDWARDS, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CAR-
TELS, REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON WAR MOBILIZATION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
MILITARY AFFAIRS, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1944) (emphasis added).
185 Quoted in id. at 33.
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As a part of a broader system of intercorporate arrangements, the du Pont
Co. shares with a subsidiary of I.G. Farbenindustrie ownership of the
Bayer-Samesan Co., through which both great corporations carry on all of
their business in the United States pertaining to seed disinfectants. In Can-
ada, Canadian Industries, Ltd., is the jointly owned subsidiary of du Pont
and Imperial Chemical Industries, which have mutually agreed that in
chemical fields occupied by both companies their chemical manufacturing
and importing activities in Canada shall be undertaken exclusively by this
subsidiary. Both in Brazil and Argentina the same two great companies
have organized subsidiaries known as Duperial, and in each case they have
agreed to do business in the country only through this subsidiary. The
function of each of the Duperial companies is not only to undertake local
manufacture but also to import the products of both parent companies, thus
apportioning shares in the local market and eliminating price competition
merely by erecting its own sales policy. The Argentine Duperial partici-
pates with Comptoir des Textiles Artificielles and with a local company,
Bunge & Born, in the joint ownership of Dueilo, a concern through which
du Pont, Imperial Chemical Industries, Comptoir, and Bunge & Born have
agreed to conduct all their rayon manufacture in the Argentine for a period
of years. 186
Examining these and other joint ventures among the world's largest
chemical firms (including joint ventures in explosives and finishes), a
court later found them to be "means designed and used by [chemical
giants] to avoid and prevent competition between themselves and with
others... They were a means used for the accomplishment of the basic
understanding for the division of world-wide territories." ' 7
In the end, this massive cooperation movement failed to achieve the
benefits its proponents had so vociferously proclaimed for it. Instead of
promoting United States exports, it reduced them - as American par-
ticipants limited their output to fit the quotas they negotiated with their
foreign rivals, and as they undertook to prevent non-participating Ameri-
can firms from undermining the cartels they had forged. Instead of
boosting technological progress, cooperation retarded it, as cartel mem-
bers struggled to maintain their vested interest in the status quo, and to
prevent what they perceived as the disruptive impact of technological
change. And, instead of reviving world economies, cooperative control
- achieved in part through alliances and joint ventures - operated to
exacerbate their performance problems, as prices were raised and pro-
duction volumes (and employment levels) were cut. 188 As the damaging
evidence mounted, infatuation with cooperation eventually ended as the
186 Id. at 7-8.
187 United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 502, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
188 For extensive documentation and illustration of these results, see EDWARDS, supra note 184,
at 9-41; STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 174, at 99-178, 216-254.
480
Joint Ventures, AntitruA and Transnational Cartelization
11:433(1991)
touchstone for public policy; by 1945, American antitrust agencies had
filed suits against cartels covering an estimated 105 commodities and
products, and involving approximately 165 firms (of which 129 were
American). 189
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no evidence that enforcement of the antitrust laws in recent
years has hampered the negotiation and effectuation of corporate joint
ventures in any demonstrable way. 9° Nor is there credible evidence that
such alliances and pacts are the keys for promoting production efficiency,
technological innovation, or international competitiveness. Indeed, there
is considerable evidence to the contrary.1 91
Joint ventures - which are, in effect, "partial" mergers and "quasi"
189 See Kreps, supra note 172, at 84, n. 29. See also W. BERGE, CARTELS: CHALLENGE To A
FREE WORLD 250-56 (1944).
190 In addition to our examination of the proliferation ofjoint ventures in petroleum, automobiles
and airlines, see Congressional Budget Office, USING R&D CONSORTIA FOR COMMERCIAL INNOVA-
"lION: SEMATECH, X-RAY LITHOGRAPHY, AND HIGH RESOLUTION SYSTEMS (June 1990). The
CBO points out that since the mid-1970s, joint ventures have been announced at an average rate of
nearly one per week, and draws the obvious conclusion "that so many joint ventures were formed
suggests that the [antitrust] law was not a major constraint; if firms wanted to form a partnership, by
and large they could." Id. at 91.
In a related vein, Professor Diane P. Wood points out that it is a myth that permissive policies
adopted toward foreign corporate collaboration by governments abroad serves to disadvantage
American firms:
The competition rules of the European Economic Community, set forth in Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome and implemented by the European Commission, are comprehensive and
strong. It is not uncommon, in fact, for practices now to be condoned in the United States that
the Commission would condemn ... From a substantive standpoint, European firms face a
regulatory regime very similar to that faced by U.S. firms.
National laws have also been strengthened all over the world. The competition laws of the
Federal Republic of Germany have been regarded as among the world's toughest for years.
Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, to name three other countries, have strengthened
their competition laws in recent years... In sum, an international consensus is building about
the basic content of competition law, such that it is no longer persuasive to argue that U.S. firms
are uniquely burdened (and benefitted) by these laws.
Wood, Commentary: Antitrust and International Competitiveness in the 1990s, 58 ANTrrRUST LAW
J. 591, 597-98 (1989). See also Brodley, Antitrust Law and Innovation Cooperation, 4 J. ECON. PER-
SPECTIVES 97 (1990).
191 In addition to the industry case studies analyzed in this article, see United States v. Ivaco, 704
F. Supp. 1409 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd. v. F.T.C., 657 F. 2d 971 (1981), cert
denied, 465 U.S. 915 (1982); United States V. Columbia Pictures Indus., 507 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.
Calif. 1980); Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F. 2d 263 (1979), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S.
1093 (1980); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. et. al., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. et. al., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950); United States v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949). In his recent analysis, Professor
John T. Scott finds that R&D joint ventures may well reduce social welfare by diminishing'competi-
tion for innovation. Scott, Diversification versus co-operation in R&D Investment, 9 MANAGERIAL
AND DECISION ECONOMICS 173 (1988).
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consolidations - should be subjected to the same litmus test for legality
as corporate mergers and acquisitions generally. At a minimum, joint
ventures should be evaluated according to the structure-oriented "func-
tional" standard for mergers articulated by the Supreme Court twenty
seven years ago in Brown Shoe,192 and explicitly applied by the Court to
joint ventures twenty-six years ago in Penn-Olin.193 As an alternative
policy, Congress might consider enacting legislation requiring the propo-
nents of any joint venture or corporate alliance exceeding a given thresh-
old size - say, $1 billion - to file a public impact statement to
accompany their proposed venture. This impact statement would require
a showing that the joint venture will enhance production efficiency; that
it will stimulate technological innovation; that it will promote interna-
tional competitiveness; and that these objectives cannot be achieved in
the absence of the proposed alliance. Unless this showing can be made,
the joint venture would be disallowed. 194 Joint ventures between smaller
192 Congress indicated plainly [in enacting the Celler-Kefauver amendment to section 7 of the
Clayton Act in 1950] that a merger had to be functionally viewed, in the context of its particular
industry. That is, whether the consolidation was to take place in an industry that was frag-
mented rather than concentrated, that had seen a recent trend toward domination by a few
leaders or had remained fairly consistent in its distribution of market shares among the partici-
pating companies, that had experienced easy access to markets by suppliers and easy access to
suppliers by buyers or had witnessed foreclosure of business, that had witnessed the ready entry
of new competition or the erection of barriers to prospective entrants, all were aspects, varying
in importance with the merger under consideration, which would properly be taken into
account.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1963).
The fundamental logic motivating this stance toward mergers, the Court explained, was Con-
gress' concern about "the rising tide of economic concentration," its "provision of authority for
arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was
still in its incipiency," and its legislative action to assure the antitrust authorities and the courts "the
power to brake this force at its outset and before it gathered momentum." Id at 317-318.
193 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). Writing for the majority, Justice
Tom C. Clark stated: "Thejoint venture, like the 'merger'... often creates anticompetitive dangers.
It is the chosen instrument of two or more corporations previously acting independently and usually
competitively with one another. The result is a 'triumvirate of associated corporations.'" Id. at 169.
The Court enunciated the following criteria for evaluating the anticompetitiveness of joint
ventures:
The number and power of the competitors in the relevant market; the background of their
growth; the power of the joint venturers; the relationship of their lines of commerce; the compe-
tition existing between them and the power of each in dealing with the competitors of the other;
the setting in which the joint venture was created; the reasons and necessities for its existence;
the joint venture's line of commerce and relationship thereof to that of its parents; the adaptabil-
ity of its line of commerce to non-competitive practices; the potential power of the joint venture
in the relevant market; an appraisal of what the competition in the relevant market would have
been if one of the joint venturers had entered it alone ... and such other factors as might
indicate potential risk to competition in the relevant market.
Id at 177. "Overall," the Court concluded, "the same considerations apply to joint ventures as to
mergers, for in each instance we are but expounding a national policy enunciated by the Congress to
preserve and promote a free competitive economy." Id. at 170.
194 Some authorities contend that the current trend in the opposite direction of affording even
more lenient treatment to joint ventures, will serve to undermine American anti-cartel policy by
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firms, and firms with insignificant market shares, would be left
undisturbed.
Perhaps Professor Michael E. Porter of the Harvard Business
School puts the public policy issue of joint ventures in proper perspec-
tive. Based on an impressive empirical study, covering scores of indus-
tries and firms across ten nations, 195 he rejects the claim that
"globalization of markets has created a new era in which the old rules of
competition must be discarded, and in which domestic rivalry is unim-
portant. '1" 96 Retreating from competition, he points out, "will not make
American companies competitive, or make America competitive."' 197
World-class economic performance, he finds, results "not from a com-
fortable home environment in which risks have been minimized, but
from pressure and challenge - from demanding home customers, from
capable home based suppliers and most of all from local rivalry." What
is needed in United States industry, he concludes, "is not less competi-
tion but more. Instead of relaxing antitrust enforcement, we should be
tightening it. Mergers and alliances between leading competitors should
be prohibited - they are good neither for companies nor for
America.... The proposal to relax antitrust scrutiny of joint production
ventures should be quietly and quickly dropped."19
Amidst the cacaphony to accord joint ventures favored status under
the antitrust laws, it may be wise to heed the counsel of Sherlock
Holmes: "It is fatal to theorize in advance of the facts."
converting even the most blatant instances of cartelization into "joint venture" cases, ensnarling the
judiciary in protracted expeditions into intricate and complicated analyses, and militating toward the
kind of ongoing government regulation and oversight that business claims to deplore. See Maher &
LaMont, National Cooperative Research Act of 1984: Cartelism for High-Tech Ventures?, 7 DICK. J.
OF INT'L LAW 2, 9, 15-16 (1988).
195 M. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990).
196 Porter, Japan Isn't Playing by Different Rules, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1990,'sec. 3, at 13, col. 2.
197 Id.
198 Id. For an analysis of the untoward economic consequences of foreign government efforts to
encourage corporate consolidation and market concentration, on the grounds of what proved to be
the misplaced belief that large corporate size and high domestic industry concentration would pro-
mote national competitiveness in global markets, see Adams & Brock, The Bigness Mystique and the
Merger Policy Debate: An International Perspective, 9 Nw. J. OF INT'L LAW & Bus. 1 (1988).
